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Presentation of the SPIPRW Series and the Working Paper 
 
We are glad to present the fourth Working Paper of the PRINWASS Project Series 
(SPIPRW). The SPIPRW Series has the objective of making available the final reports of the 
PRINWASS Project. This project was carried out between 2001 and 2004 and was funded by 
the European Union’s Fifth Framework Programme. PRINWASS is a major landmark for our 
network, as WATERLAT-GOBACIT was created by a group of PRINWASS partners after 
the project ended to continue working together on the politics of water and water services.  
Although some time has passed since the project ended, the topics addressed and the 
project’s findings have significant relevance and can contribute towards better understanding 
some of the challenges currently facing the implementation of progressive, egalitarian water 
politics. In short, PRINWASS’ main objective was to examine critically the policies of 
privatization of water and sanitation services implemented worldwide during the 1990s, 
looking at specific cases from Africa, Europe and Latin America. The project carried out case 
studies in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, England and Wales, Finland, Greece, Kenya, Mexico, 
and Tanzania, and developed comparative analyses of the main findings. Although the reports 
were freely available by request, and we produced a number of specific publications based on 
the project’s findings, much of the material remains largely unknown and, for this reason, we 
launched the SPIPRW Series to facilitate their dissemination. 
This Working Paper presents the Final Report that provides an overview of the 
PRINWASS Project and a summary of main findings. The original report was written in 
2004, and therefore sometimes contains references that may be outdated. We decided to keep 
the original text, and only edited it to adapt the formatting and to make some corrections. We 
hope that the readers will find this material useful and that it can contribute to the work of our 
researchers, students, activists, and others in their activities to understand better the internal 
workings and the huge impacts of water privatization processes. These policies are not only 
very much alive, but are also experiencing a worldwide revival. Therefore, we believe that the 
findings and lessons that emerged from the PRINWASS Project deserve this publication 
effort. We wish you all a pleasant and fruitful reading. 
 
 
 
 
José Esteban Castro 
Newcastle upon Tyne, June 2016 
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Original report cover published in August 2004 
 
 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page3 
Acronyms 
 
AASA  Aguas Argentinas (Buenos Aires water utility, Argentina) 
ASSEMAE National Association of Municipal Water and Sanitation Services (Brazil) 
BOT  Build-Operate-Transfer 
BOO  Build-Operate-Own 
CAASA Aguascalientes Water Company S. A. (Mexico) 
CAN  National Water Commission (Mexico) 
COMPESA Pernambuco’s Water and Sanitation Company (Brazil) 
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bibliography under the name of the document’s main author or co-ordinator, as 
it may correspond. When a reference is made in the text, I provide both the 
acronym and the author’s reference: D2 (Seppälä, 2002). A full list of the 
project’s deliverables can be consulted in the project’s web site: 
http://www.prinwass.org.  
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Barriers to and conditions for the involvement of private 
capital and enterprise in water supply and sanitation in Latin 
America and Africa: Seeking economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability. Final Project Report 
 
 
José Esteban Castro, Project Co-ordinator1  
Newcastle University, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
Introduction2 
 
This reports presents an overview of the original project goals, objectives, and research 
plan, and discusses the characteristics of the work done and the main findings. It is 
based on the whole range of reports produced during the project life, in particular the 10 
full case study-reports,3 1 complementary case study report,4 6 cross-comparative 
reports covering the key analytical dimensions of the project,5 and the 9 country 
strategic reports.6 Section 1 reviews the research problem, questions and objectives that 
we set up in the original proposal. Section 2 briefly explains the structure of the 
research, its main analytical dimensions and phases, and the chosen methodological 
approach, including an overall description of the group of case studies. Section 3 
presents the main findings according to the objectives proposed and looking at the 
economic-financial trends, infrastructure and environmental aspects, socio-economic 
and demo-geographic structures and processes, and socio-political factors. Section 4 
provides a synthesis of the main conclusions. An Appendix offers some additional 
                                              
1 E-mail: esteban.castro@ncl.ac.uk.  
2 We have avoided unnecessary referencing throughout the report to make the text more readable, 
although for specific pieces of information or analysis we have provided the relevant references for easy 
consultation. Apart from these cases, all the information on which this report is based has been extracted 
from the PRINWASS case study reports, strategic country reports, and cross-comparative reports, which 
are listed by author in alphabetic order in the Reference List. 
3 Azpiazu et. al. (2003), Castro (2003), Crenzel (2003), Kallis and Coccossis (2003), Crespo et. al. 
(2003), Mashauri (2003), Nyangeri (2003), Seppälä et. al. (2003), Torregrosa et. al. (2003), and Vargas 
(2003). 
4 Roze (2003). 
5 Azpiazu and Schorr (2004), Castro (2004b), Crenzel and Forte (2004), Kallis and Coccossis (2004), 
Torregrosa et. al. (2004), and Vargas and Seppälä (2004). 
6 Azpiazu et. al. (2004), Castro (2004a), Laurie et. al. (2004), Kallis and Coccossis (2004b), Mashauri 
(2004), Nyangeri (2004), Seppälä (2004), Torregrosa and Kloster (2004), and Vargas (2004). 
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information, but for a full account of the arguments and evidence the reader should look 
at the relevant base reports (see Reference List). 
In the strategic country reports we have incorporated a reference to the most 
likely trajectories that WSS may follow during the next decade, which aims at 
providing insights and reference points for policy design and implementation in the 
field. We have also included policy recommendations in these reports and also in the 
cross-comparative studies. We aim at developing abridged versions of the 
recommendations in the form of policy briefs and other dissemination instruments, 
which will be available through the project’s web site: http://www.prinwass.org. 
 
 
 
1. The research problem, questions, and objectives 
 
 
Our research problem has been centred on the continued failure to provide essential 
water and sanitation services in less developed countries (LDCs). The figures are well 
known: 1.1 billion people worldwide have no access to safe drinking water, 2.4 billion 
people lack basic sanitation, and 5 million people die each year from preventable water-
related infections, while millions are affected by long-term illnesses caused by the 
intake of health-threatening substances naturally present in water such as sulphates, 
arsenic, or manganese. Preventable diarrhoeal diseases alone kill about 2 million people 
every year, most of whom are children under 5 years of age living in peri-urban and 
rural areas of LDCs under conditions of extreme poverty. An estimated 6,000 children 
die each day from preventable water-related diseases. 
In our perspective, as stated in the original project proposal,  
 
The reasons for the lack of access to water and sanitation services 
affecting a large share of the world population are not only technical, but 
also socio-economic, organisational, institutional, political and cultural. 
In the developing world, the problem is more often caused by policy and 
institutional failure, rather than by technical failure (PRINWASS, 2000: 
3).  
 
Within this overall framework we decided to focus on the main efforts being 
implemented by the international community in order to tackle the problem. In this 
regard, our research target has been the mainstream water and sanitation (WSS) policies  
implemented in the sector since the 1980s, which have promoted the expansion of 
private sector participation (PSP), especially that of multinational private water 
monopolies, as the key strategy to solve the situation in developing countries. 
According to information available at the time when we developed the research 
proposal, investment flows and the number of contracts involving PSP in the provision 
of WSS in developing countries had significantly increased since 1990 (Table 1). 
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Table 1. International Investments Flows in Developing and Transition Countries for 
     Water and Sanitation (1984-1997) 
 
Year   Number of contracts    Increase (% )    Value (€ million) Increase (% ) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All Developing Countries 
1984-90       8                    300          
 
1990-97     97  1,137%                 25,000      7,900% 
 
 
Breakdown by region (1990-97) 
East Asia    30         12,000 
 
Eastern Europe/Central Asia  15      1,500 
 
Latin America/ Caribbean  40      8,300 
 
Middle East/North Africa    4      3,300 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa     8           37 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Elaborated from DFID (2000). 
 
 
This expansion of PSP reflected policy decisions in developed countries about 
how investment, aid, and loans to developing countries should be directed. It was based 
on the diagnosis made in the mainstream literature that the public sector had failed to 
deliver an efficiently managed universal provision of essential WSS –an empirical 
question–, and that the main reason for this failure is that the public sector is inherently 
inefficient to produce and distribute goods and services –a theoretical and ideological 
assumption. This assumption was complemented in the literature with the assertion that 
the private sector is inherently superior and more efficient than the public, on the basis 
of which a number of claims were derived that provided the main rationale for the 
policies being implemented in the WSS sector worldwide. Our main interest was 
precisely to explore and evaluate the validity of these claims regarding the expected 
impact of PSP in the water and sanitation sector of LDCs. 
As identified in the original project proposal, mainstream WSS policies claim, 
among other issues, that expanding PSP is the best strategy for 
 
o enhancing the efficiency of infrastructure services; 
o extending their delivery to the poor; 
o relieving pressure on public budgets by providing fresh private 
investment; 
o improving social equity.7 
                                              
7 As stated, for instance, in World Bank (1998: 1); Savedoff and Spiller (1999); IDB (1998): 120. 
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However, there were already warning signs that the policies were not achieving 
their stated objectives. For instance, as Table 1 already suggests, there were high 
regional inequalities in the way in which these efforts were directed, with a high 
concentration of projects in Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia, while other 
regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa were receiving little attention. In addition, there 
was also a strong concentration by country, reflecting that the unevenness of the process 
was also intra-regional, as shown in Table 2. These inequalities were also expressed in 
other forms, in particular in the concentration of PSP projects in water supply to the 
neglect of much needed investment in the wastewater collection, treatment and disposal 
(Silva et. al., (1998). 
 
 
Table 2.  Top Five Developing Countries by Total Investment in WSS (1990-97) 
 
Country      Value (€ million) Number of projects 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina   6,837     7          
 
Philippines   6,435     3 
 
Malaysia    5,362     6 
 
Turkey    1,360     2 
 
Mexico       660   12 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Elaborated from Silva et. al. (1998). 
 
 
 
We assumed the hypothesis that these trends were indicating that the particular 
forms of private involvement been promoted by mainstream WSS policies may be 
contributing to worsening regional and local inequalities in the context of increasing 
market globalisation. This hypothesis received some support from the fact that those 
regions with the highest level of private investment in WSS like Latin America had also 
seen their inequality gap widened during the 1990s which, “regardless of the 
measurement used”, made the subcontinent the most unequal region in the world (IDB 
(1998). The claim that PSP would fill the gap left by the state in extending services to 
the poor and reducing social inequity was not being matched by the emerging empirical 
evidence. 
Also, it was evident that the expansion of PSP was not necessarily being 
reflected in increased infrastructure efficiency or in the relief of public sector debt 
through the increase of genuine fresh private investment. There were already well-
known examples of private sector failure in the 1990s due to worsening efficiency 
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standards in WSS, not only in developing countries but also in the developed world.8 
Also, the level of indebtedness of some countries, Argentina perhaps the best example, 
had more than doubled during the 1990s, and the expansion of PSP seemed to be adding 
to the problem. For instance, in the case of Tucumán, Argentina, the collapse of a PSP 
concession in 1997 as a result of widespread public dissatisfaction with steep price 
increases and the worsening quality of the service resulted in a new financial threat for 
the already burdened public sector. The private consortium Aguas del Aconquija, led by 
the French water monopoly Vivendi, sued the Argentinean government for 300 million 
dollars in compensation for the cancellation of the contract (in concept of expenses and 
future earnings lost over the 30 years of the original concession). The fact that the 
tribunal where the case was presented was the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), closely related to one of the major sponsors of PSP, the 
World Bank, was casting shadows over the transparency and justice with which the trial 
could be conducted.9 A similar situation took place in the case of Cochabamba with the 
collapse in March 2000 of the concession of the local water utility to International 
Water, which sued the Bolivian government before the ICSID for 30 million dollars. 
This case was aggravated because Bolivia, leaving aside Haiti and Nicaragua, is the 
poorest country in Latin America. In Aguascalientes, Mexico, the private operator (led 
also by the French group Vivendi) had to be rescued from bankruptcy by the public 
sector after the 1994 financial crisis, which involved an undisclosed amount in concept 
of state subsidy and the significant reduction of the private operator’s financial 
responsibilities for investment in infrastructure. By the late 1990s the claims about the 
supposed higher efficiency of private sector operators and the beneficial impact of PSP 
on public finances were increasingly contested in the light of the mounting evidence to 
the contrary. 
Nevertheless, the debate has been marred by entrenched ideological positions 
and narrow interests which obscure the capacity of the actors involved for rational 
argumentation and practical action. Contributing to the rationalization of this debate is 
perhaps the most important general objective underlying our research effort. We are not 
neutral in this debate –and the team members held different opinions and positions 
regarding this debate–, but have made an effort to produce objective results, based on 
empirical evidence, while engaging with representatives of all sectors involved in order 
to ensure a maximum degree of exposure of our arguments to constructive criticism. In 
this connection, to start exploring the claims and counterclaims around PSP we 
elaborated a series of research questions, which had both an intellectual gist as well as a 
practical, policy-oriented preoccupation. We were interested in addressing the 
following issues: 
 
 
 
                                              
8 We referred at the time to the work of Lorrain et. al,.(1997); Morgan et. al. (1996); Haughton (1996). 
9 As such, to the best of our knowledge, the case continues to be unresolved at the time this report is 
being written [August 2004]. The company lost the case in the first audience, but it appealed the decision. 
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• What was the theoretical ground informing these claims and the design 
and implementation of mainstream WSS policies? 
• What was the historical or empirical evidence used to support these 
claims and the particular policy options chosen? 
• What can be learnt from the recent experiences of success and failure in 
the implementation of these policies in LDCs? 
• What are the critical success conditions and crucial barriers for private 
participation in WSS in developing countries? 
• How these factors may affect the future implementation and 
development of WSS systems with private sector involvement that are 
not only efficient but also socio-economic and environmentally 
sustainable and democratically accountable? 
 
 
In order to address these initial exploratory questions we adopted a number of 
research objectives that would orientate the research effort: 
 
• Assessing the theoretical foundations of the current policy prescription 
for improving WSS in developing countries, focusing on the policy-
institutional, economic-financial and socio-political/cultural aspects; 
• Analysing the continuities and emerging trends in structural approaches 
to improving sustainable WSS; drawing on a cross-comparative report 
for the countries studied; 
• Identifying the barriers to and conditions for improving WSS in urban 
and peri-urban areas of developing countries (with particular reference to 
legal, administrative, policy, economic-financial, political, socio-
cultural, etc. issues); 
• Analysing, and assessing the significance of, the interactions between 
the requirements of global financial and other institutions and the 
structural contexts and the barriers to and conditions for improvement in 
WSS; 
• Establishing and assessing recent and current experiences of private 
sector involvement in the WSS sector of the case-study countries and 
provide analytical reports for each country; 
• Developing an indicative framework of strategy and processes, 
expressed by relevant guidelines, for sustainable WSS in developing 
countries, taking into account the roles of the state (national, regional, 
and local government levels), civil society (users associations, citizen 
movements, etc.), and market forces (privatised water utilities, public-
private partnerships, and other forms of private sector involvement in 
WSS). 
The sequence leading to the identification of the claims and the elaboration of 
the research questions and objectives is illustrated in Figure 1. The diagram also shows 
the forward links connecting with the actual research work consisting in the search for 
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evidence, evaluation, explanation, and contributions towards the enhancement of policy 
options and the expansion of knowledge. 
 
 
Figure 1. The problem-centred research approach 
Policy problem, 
redefined as research 
problem
Research questions and 
objectives
ClaimsExisting Theory 
and Knowledge
New Evidence
Evaluation
Explanation
Revised Policy Options
Extended knowledge
Reformulation of 
policy problems
Revised claims
 
 
 
The original research questions and objectives were revised and confirmed at 
the Second Research Workshop that took place in Mexico City on 31 March and 1 
April 2003. It was agreed then that the project’s questions and objectives remained 
valid despite the significant developments that had taken place since the PRINWASS 
research proposal was conceived in 1999-2000, in particular the adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2015/2025, and the changing role and 
strategies of the private water multinationals since 2002. We come back to these issues 
later. 
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2. The research structure 
 
The research work was structured around case studies and was divided into three 
phases, as illustrated in Figure 2. The first phase was aimed at elaborating the initial 
analytical framework to be applied in the case studies, in particular for the three central 
dimensions of the study: the policy-institutional, economic-financial, and socio-political 
and cultural. In this phase we also developed a provisional operationalization of these 
dimensions, through the identification of the main sub-dimensions and indicators for 
collecting information in the case studies.10 The adoption of this common framework 
built around six dimensions11 and their corresponding substructures was aimed at 
enhancing the conditions of comparability across the highly diverse case studies. 
 
 
           Figure 2. The project structure 
Case 
Studies
Policy-institutional
Analytical 
Dimensions
Economic-financial
Socio-demographic
Socio-political and Cultural
Environmental
Techno-infrastructural
Cross-
comparative 
Analyses
First Phase Second Phase Third Phase
Strategic
Country 
Reports
Final 
Reports
 
 
  
                                              
10 See Appendix A1 “Operationalization of the analytical dimensions”. 
11 In the original proposal we had identified seven dimensions but later decided that the contents of the 
dimension “Water sector trends” were already subsumed under other dimensions, especially the 
“Environmental”, “Policy-Institutional”, and “Techno-infrastructural”. 
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2.1. The case studies 
 
The selection of cases was oriented at covering a wide range of experiences and 
conditions. From a certain perspective, an ideal strategy could be selecting cases that 
are highly homogeneous in some characteristics but with different patterns in the results 
observed regarding PSP. For instance, one could select all cases with participation of 
global water multinationals, with at lest a minimum period of experience (e.g. not 
considering cases with less than five years of PSP), and looking at cities of a certain 
size (e.g. not less than 100 thousand inhabitants), with results of success and failure in 
the implementation of PSP (measured against some concrete parameter, for instance, 
degree of compliance with the contractual obligations). However, an alternative strategy 
would be to select cases with contrasting characteristics in order to elicit a richer set of 
observables, which would allow exploring the impact of PSP in the water and sanitation 
sector on a wider range of situations. 
Our selection of cases is closer to this second alternative, but was also 
influenced by the actual possibilities of the research partners in terms of expected 
access to information, personal contacts, capacity for carrying out the field work within 
a restricted budget,12 and opportunity. The latter point is very important because our 
object is a mobile target: concessions are negotiated, granted, renegotiated, and 
cancelled some times in a matter of months. Therefore we adopted a flexible approach 
at the beginning of the project before finally deciding which cases would be selected. 
Another crucial factor was that selection of cases was also influenced by the existing 
relationships between the research partners, as we preferred to choose cases that were 
already familiar to the partners, not venturing into unknown situations for which we 
could be unprepared given the many constraints facing the team.     
Nevertheless, in the original proposal we had identified most of the cases where 
the studies would be finally carried out. However, we allowed individual partners to re-
examine the original selection of cases in the light of new developments and 
information, which led to a few changes in the original set of cases. In Argentina, for 
example, the peculiar conditions of the local partners allowed them to provide two full 
reports rather than one as originally planned, covering the cases of Buenos Aires 
(Aguas Argentinas) and Tucumán, the capital of the namesake province, separately. In 
addition, we had a complementary report covering some dimensions of the research for 
the case of Resistencia, capital of the North-eastern province of Chaco. In other cases, 
like Kenya and Tanzania, the local researchers were able to further specify the case 
studies originally targeted. In Kenya, the final decision was to look at the case of Nyeri 
municipality in the Central Province, the most advanced in terms of economic and 
human development, and Tala Town in the Eastern Province, one of the most 
disadvantaged. In Tanzania, the decision was to change the original location of 
Zanzibar for Dar es Salaam, where after several years of cumbersome negotiations a 
private concession was taking off in 2001-2 and was finally granted in 2003. In Brazil, 
                                              
12 The original budget asked was reduced by 25 percent once the project was approved for funding. 
Although we did not change our task plan, we needed to plan the field work with even greater economy 
than already envisaged in the project proposal. 
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the local partner decided to keep the cases of Limeira (Sao Paulo) and Niterói (Rio de 
Janeiro), but replaced the original locations of Santo André and Diadema (Sao Paulo) 
by the Lakes Region in Rio de Janeiro as the opportunity emerged to examine the 
original case of an inter-municipal body given in concession to a consortium headed by 
a European public company acting as a private operator. Finally, in Mexico the decision 
was to concentrate the study on the city of Aguascalientes, capital of the state of 
Aguascalientes, most particularly because this was the first full concession of WSS to a 
private operator in Mexico and was considered by the authorities to be a pilot case for 
the expansion of PSP in the country. Table 3 presents the final selection of cases. 
 
 
   Table 3. The selected case studies   
REGION/ 
COUNTRY 
 
CASE POPULATION WSS OPERATOR13 PERIOD OF 
OPERATION 
AFRICA 
 
Kenya 
Nyeri 120,540 NYEWASCO, 
corporate14 municipally 
owned  
1998 to date 
Tala 22,375 Romane Agencies Ltd., 
private 
1999 to date 
Tanzania Dar es Salaam  2,497,940   City Water Services Ltd., 
private, (Biwater Plc / 
JBG Gauff Ingenieure) 
2003 to date 
EUROPE 
England Thames River 
basin 
12,493,000 RWE-Thames Water, 
private 
1989 to date 
Greece  Athens   3,187,734 EYDAP, mixed entity 
controlled by the state15  
As a mixed entity 
since 1999 to date 
 
Finland 
 
Lahti 98,000 LV Lahti Water Ltd. Over 30 years 
Lappavesi16 36,000 Lappavesi Ltd. and 
Lapua Sewerage Ltd., 
municipal 
1972 to date 
Kangasala 23,000 Kangasala Municipality 
Water and Sewerage Ltd 
1950s to date 
  
                                              
13 Name of the operator (acronyms explained in list at the beginning)), type (public, private or mixed), 
and leading partner (for multinational consortia). 
14 NYEWASCO is owned by Nyeri Municipal Council but is run by a Corporate Management Team on 
the basis of private sector operation and management models. It is part of a Pilot Project to reorganize 
Kenyan municipal WSS around commercial principles, in preparation to be eventually granted in 
concession to the private sector. 
15 The company floated 39 percent of its shares, which are owned by private investors. 
16 Includes the municipalities of Lapua (population 13,000), Nurmo (population 11,000), Kauhava 
(population 8,000), and Kuortane (population 4,000). 
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    Table 3. Case studies (continued) 
REGION/ 
COUNTRY 
 
CASE POPULATION WSS OPERATOR PERIOD OF 
OPERATION 
 
LATIN AMERICA 
 
Argentina 
Buenos Aires 11,453,725 AASA, private (Suez - 
Ondeo) 
1993 to date 
Tucumán 697.936 ENOHSA, provincial 
operator17 
1998 to date 
Resistencia 
(Chaco) 
365,637 SAMEEP, provincial 
operator 
1980 to date 
Bolivia Cochabamba 517,024 SEMAPA, municipal 
operator18 
1967 to date 
 
Brazil       
 
Niterói (Rio de 
Janeiro) 
  459,451 Águas de Niterói, 
private 
1999 to date 
Lakes Region 19 
(Rio de Janeiro) 
      
   403,418 PROLAGOS, private 
(EPAL) 
1998 to date 
Limeira (Sao 
Paulo) 
249,046 Aguas de Limeira 
(Suez, Ondeo) 
1995 to date 
Mexico Aguascalientes     643,419 CAASA, private 
(Vivendi - Veolia) 
1993 to date 
 
 
As it can be noticed, the variation between cases is high in several respects. 
Firstly, it is important to explain that although the project focused on PSP participation, 
we also considered some cases of public sector ownership and management. In some 
cases, like Finland, although all water utilities are in public hands, mainly 
municipalities, and cooperatives, the private sector has historically played a very active 
role but in a different capacity to the one promoted in mainstream WSS policies. 
Nevertheless, the private sector takes up to 80 percent of the revenue generated by the 
utilities, which illustrates the relevance of this model for the research. In other cases, 
like Athens, the public sector company has floated part of its shares (39 percent) which 
are now in private hands, providing another model of PSP worth exploring. In Nyeri, 
Kenya, the water utility is still public but being prepared to be eventually granted in 
concession to the private sector, which provides insights into the dynamic of the PSP 
                                              
17 This is one of two cases of failed PSP concession. In 1995 WSS were granted in concession to Aguas 
del Aconquija, a consortium led by the French group Vivendi, but the contract was cancelled in 1997 and 
the company was taken over by the public sector. 
18 This is the second failed PSP concession. The city’s WSS were granted in concession to Aguas del 
Tunari, a consortium led by International Water (controlled by the American company Bechtel), in 1999, 
but the concession contract was cancelled in April 2000 and the company was taken over by the 
municipality. 
19 Includes the municipalities of Arauama, Saquarema, Silva Jardim, Armação dos Búzios, Arraial do 
Cabo, Cabo Frío, Iguaba Grande and S. Pedro da Aldeia. 
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process before it is openly launched. In Tucumán and Cochabamba we have public 
companies that had to take back the WSS after the collapse of the private concessions in 
both cases. Figure 3 provides a schematic description of this diversity of the cases with 
regard to ownership and management. 
 
Figure 3. The diversity of ownership and management schemes in the cases  
 
 
 
Secondly, the variation is also high when we consider the population size and 
the scale of the areas served by the different operators, ranging from small towns of 
between 4 thousand and slightly over 20 thousand people in Finland and Kenya to huge 
populations like in the Thames River basin totalling around 12.5 million people or 
Buenos Aires with just under 11.5 million people –around one third of the country’s 
population. The water utilities examined are serving urban areas that range from 21 
square kilometres in Nyeri to almost 3 thousand square kilometres in the Lakes Region 
of Rio de Janeiro, with population densities that go from 9.5 persons per square 
kilometre in Kuortane, Finland, to 13.7 thousand people per square kilometre in Buenos 
Aires (Federal Capital).  These factors have an obviously crucial importance for the 
provision of WSS and need to be kept in mind during the presentation of the main 
results of the research to minimize distortion. Table 4 presents the cases according to 
population size, urban area, and population density. We consider some of these issues 
later on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public ownership 
and management 
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Cochabamba 
Tucumán 
Lahti 
Kangasala 
Lappavesi and Lapua 
Aguascalientes 
Buenos Aires 
Limeira 
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Dar es Salaam Athens Nyeri 
Private ownership 
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Public ownership, 
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Public ownership, 
in preparation for 
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Mixed ownership, 
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  Table 4. Case studies by population size, urban area, and population density 
CASE POPULATION URBAN AREA 
(square km) 
POPULATION 
DENSITY 
(population/sq. km) 
Thames River basin 
                  
London 
 
12,493,000   
 
7,188,000  
 
 
1,590.00 
 
 
 
4,480.0 
 
Buenos Aires  11,453,725 202.9 13,679.6 
Athens   3,187.734 456.7 6,979.0 
Dar es Salaam  2,497,940   1350.0 1850.0 
Tucumán     697,936 90.0 5,862.3 
Aguascalientes     643,419 86.3 68.9 
Cochabamba 517,024 55.6 3,713.0 
Niterói   459,451 134.5 3,507.0 
Lakes Region           403, 418 2,957.9 136.4 
Limeira 249,046 579.0 430.0 
Nyeri 120,540 20.8 721.0 
Lahti 98,000 134.98* 726.0 
Kangasala 23,000 353.85* 65.0 
Tala 22,375 33.7 721.0 
Lapua 13,000 75.0 18.6 
Nurmo 11,000 36.2 31.3 
Kauhava 8,000 48.5 16.8 
Kuortane 4,000 46.2 9.5 
* Estimated 
 
 
Thirdly, the hydrological and other physical-natural conditions affecting the 
provision of WSS are also highly variable across the cases, and these are crucial factors 
determining, for instance, different levels of investment for the energy inputs and 
conveyance structures needed for water abstraction, treatment, and distribution, which 
differ substantially between cities like Aguascalientes, London, or Buenos Aires. 
Likewise, pollution problems are very different in locations dependent on surface water 
than those relying more or completely on underground aquifers. Chart 1 shows just one 
of the aspects, the type of water sources on which the cases are dependent, to illustrate 
this variability. 
 
 
 
  
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page20 
 
 
   Chart 1. Water sources used in the case studies 
 
* In London the proportion of surface water used is higher than the basin’s average. 
Source: Torregrosa et. al. (2004). 
 
 
Finally, there are other elements that also impinge on the comparability of the 
cases, some of which are addressed in the presentation of the main results, but there is 
one more important aspect that is worth highlighting here: the temporal scale of the PSP 
experience in the cases studied. In this regard, a tentative classification is to cluster the 
cases20 into four groups: “mature” PSP cases, with over 10 years of experience, 
intermediate cases from 5-10 years of PSP experience, incipient cases below 5 years of 
PSP experience, and failed cases. Table 5 shows the cases grouped according to their 
PSP experience in a temporal scale. 
 
  
                                              
20 We did not include here the Finnish cases. 
Intake
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
UK (Thames River Basin)*
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ARGENTINA (Buenos Aires)
TANZANIA (Dar es Salaam)
BOLIVIA (Cochabamba)
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ARGENTINA (Tucumán)
BRAZIL (Niterói)
BRAZIL (Limeira)
KENYA (Nyeri)
MEXICO (Aguascalientes)
FINLAND (Lahti)
KENYA (Tala)
FINLAND (Kangasala)
% of underground / surface water
underground
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  Table 5. Case studies by duration of the PSP experience 
TEMPORAL 
SCALE OF PSP 
CASE START DATE NUMBER OF YEARS 
 
 
 
 
Mature 
 
Thames River basin               1989                 15 
Buenos Aires  1993                 11 
Aguascalientes 1993                 11 
 
 
Intermediate 
Limeira 1995                   9 
Lakes Region        1998                   6 
Nyeri 1998                   6 
Athens  1999                   5 
Tala 1999                   5 
Niterói 1999                   5 
Incipient Dar es Salaam 2003                   1 
 
Failed 
 
Tucumán 1995-97                   2 
Cochabamba 1999-2000   Less than 1  
 
 
This information is crucial and must be kept in mind when reading the main 
results summarised in this report to avoid a misinterpretation of the conclusions. Many 
of the processes involved in the provision of WSS have to be considered in the context 
of their middle- to long-term lifecycles, such as the investment in maintenance, renewal 
and expansion (or decay) of WSS infrastructure, the environmental impact of rising 
volumes of raw water abstractions and unsafe disposal of untreated wastewater, or the 
influence of deindustrialization processes on the dynamics, levels, and quality of 
groundwater. This makes difficult sometimes to clearly allocate responsibilities to the 
different actors (e.g. public or private) with regard for instance to the evaluation of 
achievements or failures. In some cases, as shown later, promoters of PSP and private 
operators have praised themselves for achievements that had actually been the result of 
longer-term processes (certainly longer than their period in charge of the concession) 
made possible by others, whether be the public sector, for instance in the 
universalization of drinking water and sanitation in Limeira, the cleaning of the Thames 
River in England, or by a convergence of multiple factors underscoring the fall of infant 
mortality rates in Argentina which, understandably, also fell in areas that have been 
given in concession to a private operator. 
Undoubtedly, even the most objective evaluation of such a sensitive topic as the 
expansion of PSP in the water and sanitation sector of developing countries is bound to 
be controversial for many reasons, but keeping these caveats in mind will contribute to 
make the conditions for detached analysis more feasible. 
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2. 2. Complexity and interdisciplinarity 
 
The above considerations about the sheer scope of the case studies and the caveats that 
need to considered while looking at the results did not take us by surprise. The team 
was aware from the start that this was a very ambitious project and that we may face 
significant obstacles to develop all the planned tasks with the same level of detail and 
precision in all our cases and across all the different project phases. As stated in the 
original project proposal, 
 
We are well aware that understanding and explaining the complex 
situations characterising the problem addressed in this research require a 
degree of sophistication and comprehensiveness, which is impossible to 
achieve in a single project. If, in addition to that, the aim is to provide 
policy options and scenarios for facilitating effective action leading to 
the correction of the problem, the obstacles and impediments assume 
gigantic proportions. […] Another obstacle may be the availability, 
reliability and comparability of data, especially concerning the coverage 
and quality standards of WSS across the different countries 
(PRINWASS, 2000: 28).  
 
In spite of these challenges, we assumed that the effort was worth doing because 
the project was aiming at breaking ground on important issues, in particular in the 
search for what we later called “meaningful interdisciplinarity” in water sector 
research.21 The objective was to move beyond paying lip service to the need of more 
interdisciplinary work and venturing into the largely uncharted terrain where social 
scientists, engineers, physical geographers, and business experts, among others,22 can 
work together on the assumption that disciplinary boundaries have been suspended at 
least for a short while. This is a risky business for everyone involved, especially if to 
the challenge posed by interdisciplinarity we add the interaction with practitioners, 
private businesses, NGOs, politicians, public servants, workers unions, users, and 
                                              
21 This was the topic of our First International Conference: “Meaningful Interdisciplinarity: Challenges 
and Opportunities for Water Research”, which took place at the University of in Oxford on 24-25 April 
2002 (http://www.prinwass.org/Conference_Apr02.shtml). The presentations for this conference are also 
available online: http://www.prinwass.org/docs_April02Conf.shtml.  
22 Our core team is composed by civil engineers (Tampere University of Technology, Finland; Dar es 
Salaam University, Tanzania; Nairobi University, Kenya), environmental planners (University of the 
Agean, Greece), geographers (Newcastle University, UK), economists (Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences, Argentina; Higher University of San Simon, Bolivia), social anthropologists (National 
University of the Northeast, Argentina), sociologists (Higher University of San Simon, Bolivia; Federal 
University of Sao Carlos, Brazil; Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, Mexico; University of 
Lisbon, Portugal; National University of Buenos Aires and National University of General Sarmiento, 
Argentina; Oxford University), and urban planners (National University of General Sarmiento, 
Argentina). 
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community organizations to just mention the main categories of actors that we engaged 
in the study.23 
 
 
2. 3. Methodology 
 
In the original proposal, we presented our approach as an exercise to examine the 
claims made in the mainstream WSS literature about the superiority of PSP over public 
sector ownership and management in a number of areas, in particular efficiency of 
infrastructure, provision of private investment, expansion of coverage to the poor, and 
enhancement of social equity, as already discussed earlier. For the sake of clarity we 
presented the exercise in the following terms: 
 
one of the predominant claims in the field is that private involvement, to 
put it shortly, improves the efficiency of WSS. If we take this claim as 
valid, then we would expect that in the context of an N number of cases 
the distribution should look like in Figure 2, that is, the largest number 
of cases represented by N should be concentrated in the bottom right 
cell, while the remaining categories should have a very low number of 
cases or no cases at all. That would be indicating that a “high” degree of 
private involvement is strongly correlated with an also “high” level of 
efficiency in the delivery of WSS. 
 
Figure 2. Claimed relation between Private Involvement  
                      and Efficiency Level in WSS 
 
 
 
Similar diagrams could be developed for the other claims being 
investigated, such as that private involvement extends the delivery of 
WSS to the poor, relieves public budgets, or improves social equity 
                                              
23 In the course of the research work we established some permanent links with many of these actors, 
which we list in our web site as “Associated Institutions” 
(http://www.prinwass.org/associated_institutions.shtml). 
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(developed in Section B 4). […] The expected result of our exercise 
should demonstrate not only that the correlation in Figure 2 has been 
much weaker than the predictions of the model have suggested, but also 
provide clues for understanding how and why this happens 
(PRINWASS, 2000: 18-9).   
 
 
As it could be expected from the previous discussion, we did not pretend to be 
able to provide a rigorous quantitative assessment but this scheme provided a logical 
framework to organize the exploration, analysis, and evaluation of the particular claims. 
As already noted, to this purpose we operationalized the main analytical dimensions 
and identified the key subdimensions and indicators to gather the relevant information 
for analysis. However, a truly quantitative analysis could only be developed for some 
dimensions, such as the economic-financial or the socio-economic and demo-
geographic, whereby we could expect to have access to data series amenable to 
quantitative methodologies. To a lesser extent, we could have expected to have 
quantitative data for the techno-infrastructural and the environmental dimensions. The 
other two crucial dimensions, the policy-institutional and the socio-political and 
cultural, were mainly focused on qualitative aspects, although obviously some 
quantitative treatment is always possible for some aspects (e.g. the impact of 
disconnection policies measured by the number of disconnected households, or civil 
disobedience fuelled by PSP expansion expressed in the proportion of unpaid water 
bills). 
As it happened, crucial quantitative information was not readily available for a 
large number of cases, and for instance in the economic-financial dimension we could 
only complete some series in three cases: the Thames River basin, Buenos Aires, and 
Athens. In most other cases different obstacles made it impossible to access basic 
information for the whole concession period, such as the text of concession contracts, 
financial plans of the private operators, or disaggregated data for infrastructure 
improvements (e.g. to distinguish between improvements in physical and commercial 
losses).24 Nevertheless, we had been aware of the potential difficulties in accessing 
sensitive information, a stated in the original proposal: 
 
Some authors have even argued that privatisation, coupled with the 
dismantling of the public sector, has prompted an institutional crisis due 
to the withdrawal of crucial information (e.g. on hydraulic management) 
that was previously in the public domain and has become the property of 
private corporations [Dourojeanni, 1999] (PRINWASS, 2000: 13).  
 
This is in fact confirmed by our research, and the lack of information and 
transparency on crucial aspects of WSS management constitutes one of the most 
                                              
24 For instance, in the cases of Brazil and Mexico this kind of information is not in the public domain and 
access to it depends on the willingness of the private operators to provide it. For different reasons our 
researchers did not gain access to this vital material. 
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important obstacles to the democratic governance of water resources and WSS and, 
consequently, to the social and political sustainability of these processes. Despite these 
obstacles, we were able to gather solid information about most aspects covered in the 
research for at least a minimum number of examples, which allowed us to build the 
comparative analysis for each analytical dimension on the basis of a core group of case 
studies. These issues, and the particular methodologies employed, are explained in the 
individual cross-comparative studies on which this report is based.25     
 
 
 
 
3. Main research findings 
 
Our starting research questions were related to the theories and existing evidence 
informing the policies being examined.  Although much of the debate has been centred 
on WSS reform, it is worth highlighting that expanding PSP in the control and even 
ownership of water resources has also become a major policy target, even when the two 
aspects are not always clearly related in the PSP projects for water and sanitation. In 
fact, according to some experts, in water sector reforms “the most significant act of 
privatisation may be the granting of property rights over water” (Lee, 1999: 93). As 
discussed later, this aspect has far-reaching implications, both at the theoretical and 
practical level, given that the actual process involves a radical change in the status of 
water resources from “public” to “private” good. In this regard, we decided to explore 
what were the theoretical ground and the historical or empirical evidence to support 
these claims about the superiority of PSP for improving water and sanitation services. 
To this purpose we focused our first research objective on “assessing the theoretical 
foundations of the current policy prescription for improving WSS in developing 
countries, focusing on the policy-institutional, economic-financial and socio-
political/cultural aspects” (PRINWASS, 2000: 3). 
In this connection, the specialized literature suggests an increasing consensus 
about the fact that the PSP policies implemented in the WSS sector since the 1980s 
have not been based on a coherent theoretical structure. Although they have often been 
presented as the logical result of the application of rigorous economic theory, they have 
actually been derived from different bodies of thought ranging from free-market 
liberalism to management theory, including neo-classical price theory, public choice, 
and property rights theory. Thus, although the central argument behind the process of 
de- and re-regulation, liberalization and PSP expansion that has dominated the global 
agenda since the 1980s derives from the neo-classical economics paradigm of 
competitive markets (Roemer and Radelet, 1991),  the fact that economic theory “fails 
to provide any conclusive reason for favouring private over public enterprise” 
(Commander and Killick, 1988: 320) has led pro-PSP thinkers to introduce arguments 
derived from the public choice and property rights schools in order to assert the 
                                              
25 Azpiazu and Schorr (2004), Crenzel and Forte (2004), Torregrosa et. al. (2004), Kallis and Coccossis 
(2004), Vargas and Seppälä (2003), and Castro (2004b). 
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superiority of the private sector over the public (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989: 663). 
Moreover, these authors have also argued that expanding PSP would help not just 
tackling inefficiency and public-sector failure but also expanding “economic 
development and democracy in developing countries” (Dinavo, 1995: 2). However, the 
evidence shows that these claims are based on an ideological set of principles, derived 
from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of free-market capitalism, but not on a sound 
theoretical framework that is internally coherent and that has been empirically tested. 
This connects with our second question aimed at placing the debate about PSP 
in historical perspective. In the mainstream literature reference to the switch from 
private to public provision of infrastructure and services that took place since the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is seldom explored ─let alone explained. 
Moreover, there is no mention to the fact that activities like wastewater conveyance and 
disposal became the exclusive responsibility of public authorities, as the private 
companies were not attracted to invest in dirty water. For example, in the World 
Development Report 2004 there is a text box to account for “private participation in 
history” referring to WSS, whereby unregulated PSP in nineteenth century London is 
uncritically and over optimistically portrayed as a success story that would have led to 
the universalization of the services. Apart from the historical mistakes incurred in the 
brief note, nothing is said about the reasons why the services had to be placed under 
public control in 1902, after decades of political confrontation, or about the fact that 
when the decision was finally taken there was widespread consensus, including from 
defenders of free-market liberalism, that WSS have to be in public hands. Moreover, 
and also uncritically, the note adds that in the 1980s WSS were again privatized in 
England and Wales, without any reference to what has happened since, conveying the 
message that somehow things have returned to normality.26 This distortion of the 
historical evidence is not uncommon in the pro PSP literature. For instance, in a co-
authored article published by the pro-privatization think tank CATO, the World Bank 
Private Sector Specialist Penelope Brook Cowen has also praised the nineteenth-century 
unregulated private water monopolies in England without any critical reference to the 
actual historical record. Moreover, she has argued in favour of the benefits of 
“unregulated privatization”, “unregulated private monopolies”, and “laissez faire” 
where “the provision of services is regulated by market forces and economic 
incentives” to solve the situation of water services in developing countries today. The 
argument follows 
 
Complete privatization of water assets and unregulated natural 
monopoly. […] The rationale for unregulated privatization is 
straightforward. An unregulated private monopoly would have an 
incentive to bring as many potential buyers into the system as possible, 
so as to maximize profit. Unregulated private monopolies could thus 
significantly increase the number of water connections in developing 
countries. If unregulated privatization could produce hook-ups for 
                                              
26 World Bank, 2003: 167. The note also makes similar claims about the history of WSS in other 
countries, including the US. 
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currently neglected low-income customers, the poor would end up with 
higher real incomes, better water service, more time for other 
endeavours, and a greater probability of a long life (Brook Cowen and 
Cowen, 1998: 22-3, 28).  
 
Leaving aside for the moment the feasibility and desirability of establishing 
unregulated private water monopolies in developing countries, let us say that the 
opposition to these policies in nineteenth-century England and elsewhere is often 
described by these authors as a kind of public-sector conspiracy or as an anti-market, 
anti-liberal or even anti-democratic development. However, the second part of the 
nineteenth century in London was characterized by ongoing political debates, which led 
first to the attempt to regulate the operation of private operators in order to ensure 
minimum standards of quality and affordability and expansion of the services to the 
rapidly growing population. The failure of early regulation to improve the situation led 
to the municipalization of public services (Taylor, 1999; Hassan, 1998; Laski et. al., 
1935; Millward, 1991) and eventually to the amalgamation of the unregulated private 
water monopolies under the control of a joint board of local authorities in 1902 
(Metropolitan Water Board, 1949). In fact, by the late nineteenth century it was 
accepted ―across the political spectrum― that the achievement of social equity (in 
relation to the access to and affordability of safe water services) could not be left to the 
unregulated working of the market forces, and rather the provision of safe water 
services became widely conceived as a societal moral duty. The cholera outbreaks of 
mid-nineteenth century triggered the assumption that ensuring access to clean water and 
safe disposal of excreta for every household —at least in urban areas— was a binding 
moral duty for the community, and the Public Health Acts established that dwellings 
lacking safe water supply were unfit for human habitation (Luckin, 1986; Ward, 1997; 
Mukhopadhyay, 1975; Goubert, 1986.  
In the Americas, the process had many similarities. In the United States, by the 
mid nineteenth century private water companies found it difficult to survive as profit-
making and self-sufficient operations been technically and economically inefficient, 
characterized by their expensive tariffs and inadequate service standards (Schultz and 
McShane, 1978; Ogle, 1999). These problems, together with the risk aversion shown by 
private undertakers who were unwilling to invest in the expansion and improvement of 
the systems, led to the takeover of most private water companies by municipal 
authorities. Thus, while in 1806 about 94 per cent of water works were private by 1896 
53 per cent had already been taken over or directly built by the public sector, a trend 
that was especially significant in the largest urban centres. Regarding sewerage 
systems, like in Britain these were almost exclusively a public sector endeavour and 
their development did not start until the second half of the nineteenth century (Keating, 
quoted in Hukka and Katko, 2002). Today, despite the expansion of PSP projects, most 
water systems in the US are still in the hands of public authorities (municipalities, 
counties, districts) or run on a not-for-profit basis, subject to strict regulation, and likely 
to remain so for the foreseeable future (National Research Council, 2002: 8, 38).  
In Latin America, after independence from Spain and especially since the 1840s, 
the development of water supply systems became very much influenced by the models 
emanating from Europe and the United States, with varying degrees and forms of public 
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(mainly municipal) and private participation. The main forms of private involvement, 
which became widespread since the 1880s in most countries of the region, were the 
concession of the services or the granting of building contracts to foreign private 
companies for developing the systems under state control and with public funding. 
Overall, by the early twentieth century privately-provided water supply in Latin 
America resembled the pattern already observed in Europe and the United States, where 
the services only reached selected neighbourhoods in the most important cities and 
private undertakers were reluctant or unable to meet the financial and technical 
challenges posed by rapid urban growth and rising quality standards. One important 
exception to this pattern was Argentina, where water and sanitation services became a 
key element of public policy since the 1880s. After a short-lived attempt to privatize the 
services in Buenos Aires, the state-owned company took control and succeeded in 
extending the networks to provide full coverage in the capital by the 1930s. Overall, the 
national states assumed a leading role in the expansion of water and sanitation since the 
early twentieth century, a trend that was further accentuated by the economic crisis of 
the 1930s. Most private water companies were taken over by the public sector in order 
to expand the services. Also, alternative forms of private initiative (as opposed to 
public, whether municipal or state) such as co-operatives, mutual associations, and not-
for-profit ventures also became important drivers for the development of public 
services, water included.27 
Therefore, the experience of PSP in the water and sanitation sector needs to be 
analysed in the light of what some authors have called the “historical cycle of 
privatization and nationalization” (Klein and Roger, 1994: 1), characterized by the 
interweaving between the expansion of public sector participation and the role of the 
private sector over time. In this regard, there is recognition that the revival of market-
driven politics (Leys, 2001), and especially the expansion of PSP, since the 1970s has 
not been as much the result of evidence-backed arguments as it has been the outcome of 
an ideological change that replaced the state by the market as the key driver of 
economic development (Lee, 1998: 51), a process that has been associated with “a clear 
rightward shift in political opinion in Europe and North America” (Commander and 
Killick, 1988: 316). In fact, there is an increasing though somewhat cautious 
recognition even among the key institutions promoting PSP that the empirical evidence 
to back the claims is at best ambiguous. For instance, in ongoing reviews of PSP 
experiences, World Bank specialists have concluded that “privatization is a difficult and 
contentious business. Privatization programmes have taken far longer to prepare and 
implement than originally envisaged. The concept’s utility is contested by many” 
(Nellis and Kikeri, 1989: 670). Moreover, privatization has become increasingly 
associated with negative social and political processes and this may help to explain why 
even key global players of the private sector prefer to avoid the term altogether. As put 
                                              
27 See, for instance: for Argentina: Silvestri (1996), Herz (1979), Bordi de Ragucci (1985); Catenazzi and 
Kullock, 1997, and Pirez (1994); for Mexico: Pani (1916), Suárez Cortez (1998), Connolly (1997), 
Márquez M., (1994), Aboites Aguilar (1998), Birrichaga Gardida (1997); Bennett (1997); Pérez-Rincón 
(2002) for Colombia; Swyngedouw (1999), for Ecuador; Rezende and Heller (2002), for Brazil. 
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by Mr Gérard Mestrallet, President-Director of Suez, one of the two largest global 
water corporations, 
 
we believe that the privatization of water infrastructures in developing 
countries is not necessary. […] The use of the term privatization made 
by some authors in their models while referring to situations where the 
public sector remains the final owner of the infrastructure constitutes an 
abuse of the language” (Mestrallet, 2001; our translation).   
 
Nevertheless, the model was adopted in many developing countries during the 
1990s, when there was a rapid expansion of PSP in the water and sanitation sector. This 
widespread adoption of mainstream WSS policies has been explained as being the result 
of a complex set of factors, including external pressures, policy emulation, the 
expansion of neo-conservative ideologies, political pragmatism in a time of deep 
economic crisis, or even political strategies directed at changing the power balance 
between national socioeconomic actors (Manzetti, 1999). From a certain perspective, 
expanding the market-driven model of WSS at a global scale became a question of 
militancy, as stated by one sympathetic commentator: 
 
It is a fact that privatization of state-owned enterprises in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America will not succeed unless the Western 
industrialized developed countries, international financial institutions, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
other aid donors continue to put pressure on these governments to 
privatize the public sector […]. Once the spirit of free enterprise reigns 
in these developing countries through privatization, the free market 
economy and democracy will emerge (Dinavo, 1995: 133).   
 
In this regard, the “active advocacy” of the OECD governments seems to have 
been a major driver of these policies, whether through the direct action of government 
departments, aid agencies, lending policies, or through the programmes designed and 
implemented by bilateral and multilateral institutions (Commander and Killick, 1988: 
314). The combination of “pressure” and “persuasion” implemented by these agencies 
was ingenuously described by a pro-privatization author referring to the situation in 
Africa, who suggested that 
 
the prospects for economic development and democracy in Africa are 
much greater through privatization than through state-owned enterprises. 
Pressure has been “applied on developing countries by international 
organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the U.S. Agency for International Development to pursue the 
policy of privatization as a part of a package of economic reforms 
[quoting]”. In order for the leaders of the developing countries to see 
privatization as their best alternative, they have to be trained and 
educated in this field through seminars conducted by scholars and 
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practitioners who have know-how in this field [our Italics] (Dinavo, 
1995:  51).   
 
Ostensibly, this agenda has met with great opposition from different quarters, a 
reaction that has often been explained as the result of ideological prejudice if not blunt 
ignorance on the part of developing countries. As put by a USAID representative 
commenting on the leading role that the agency was taking in promoting privatization 
into the 21st century 
 
The U.S. Agency for International Development is defining future 
directions for privatization assistance based on the experience of the last 
15 years ─from a modest start in Latin America to the recent crescendo 
dominated by assistance to formerly Communist states. In the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the 
privatization of state-run enterprises and the dismantling of state 
monopolies are critical to these nations’ transition to free markets. […] 
Poorer countries and governments ideologically resistant to opening 
their markets ─largely in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and 
South Asia─ will need continuing technical and policy support, as well 
as new, creative interventions [our Italics] (Farley, 1997: 10). 
 
No doubt, a large share of the extensive range of papers, articles, and books 
published on this topic in recent years has been the result of this educational crusade. 
To give just an example, let us consider briefly the following justification for 
introducing PSP in the water sector by Terence Lee and Andrei Jouravlev from the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). They asserted 
that “a number of different arguments suggest that, in the water sector, the regulation of 
privately owned and managed monopolies would increase economic efficiency”, and 
suggested a series of advantages that would result from privatization, including 
 
• “reduced political interference”, which is blamed for the “poor 
performance of the public enterprises in the water sector” owing to the 
“politicization of key decisions regarding tariffs and personnel 
administration, and lack of managerial autonomy”; 
• “changing property rights”, as according to “property rights theory […] 
public ownership attenuates property rights, reducing incentives to 
minimize costs and […] privatization will restore them; 
• avoiding “regulatory capture”, as “it is very difficult to solve the 
principal-agent problem that exists between the state as an owner and the 
managers of the state-owned enterprises without privatization 
(concentration of ownership). […] The diffuse nature of public property 
makes the principal-agent problem more difficult to solve in state-owned 
enterprises. Private sector managers, in contrast, are better able to pursue 
efficiency because their objectives are more clearly articulated”; 
• “more effective financial management” as “private companies have to 
raise resources in the capital market. This means that they are subject to 
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the discipline imposed by the private capital market and the market for 
corporate control. Public utilities, in contrast, obtain their financing 
through the state. […] In addition, private sector managers have a direct 
personal stake in the profitability of their enterprises, something that is 
lacking in the public sector, where commercial objectives are 
subordinated to political goals and the threat of bankruptcy is absent. 
Public sector managers lack financial rewards resulting from increases in 
portfolio values. Consequently, their planning horizon would be short, 
i.e. until the next election, and the enterprises they manage would be 
characterized by a shorter time frame of reference foregoing investments 
yielding longer-term returns in favour of short-term investments yielding 
immediate and visible benefits. The short planning horizon also makes 
them more vulnerable to short-sighted political pressures (Lee and 
Jouravlev, 1997). 
 
 
Many other examples of these highly influential arguments supporting the 
expansion of PSP in the water sector can be easily documented. And yet, when we 
observe the actual implementation of these policies in the field, public utility policies 
are embedded in specific socio-political and cultural environments, as well as peculiar 
historical circumstances, not being easily transferable from one national/regional 
context to another. Therefore, it is not surprising that the actual success in transplanting 
or adapting these models has been highly variable. For instance, there are very 
influential reference models of pro-market policies for WSS services being promoted 
by multilateral and external support agencies, mostly based on the French and the 
Anglo-American experiences (involving, respectively, concession and lease operations 
exclusively regulated by contracts and elected authorities on one hand, and specialized 
and powerful autonomous agencies and commissions in charge of regulating services 
fully privatized or delegated to private operators on the other). Such reference models 
seem to be more influential in highly urbanized Latin-American countries, such as 
Argentina and Brazil, than they are in Africa. Despite the influence that External 
Support Agencies (ESAs) and donors have in policy formulation and reform in the 
African continent, geo-economic and socio-cultural conditions are radically different 
and specific to fit in any pure or adapted model developed abroad. 
Also, after recognizing the influence of multilateral agencies such as the World 
Bank in promoting PSP in the WSS sector, it is important to emphasise that in all the 
developing country cases studied these policies were in some way adapted or adopted 
by the national governments and other relevant local actors. One example is Argentina, 
where the neoliberal model of privatisation through large concessions granted to 
transnational companies promoted by the World Bank was adopted by the federal 
government in a far reaching reform programme that often went well beyond what was 
deemed acceptable for the IFIs themselves.28 Contrariwise, although in Brazil most 
                                              
28 For instance, the little or almost non existent level of regulation characterizing most concessions 
granted during the early 1990s, including the case of Aguas Argentinas in Buenos Aires. 
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privatisation policies developed under the Cardoso administration were also primarily 
guided by macro-economic aims related to fiscal adjustment and monetary stabilisation, 
the strong mobilisation of the country’s important WSS stakeholders in a context of 
higher institutional complexity than in the Argentinean case, impeded the full adoption 
of a national neoliberal policy in this field. As a result, and after long-standing and 
unresolved institutional changes PSP has been mostly limited to municipal concessions 
and BOT contracts with an important participation of national companies. Likewise, the 
overall institutional reform of Kenya’s water sector is being developed since the late 
1990s with the support of international cooperation agencies. However, it is clear that 
such reforms are not imitating any exogenous policy model, but rather seeking to build 
an institutional framework which takes into account the specific socio-economic, 
cultural and geographic conditions already involved in the supply of drinking water and 
sanitation services in the country. These examples show that the model has not been 
mechanically applied but has been adapted and adopted in different ways (Vargas and 
Seppälä, 2004). 
Nevertheless, in addition to the controversial theoretical validity of the claims 
made about PSP, in perspective it is now clear that the mainstream model has failed to 
deliver the expected results. World Bank analysts have recognized that the impact of 
private sector participation in infrastructure provision on sustainable economic growth 
has been “unclear” (Alexander and Estache, 2000: 1), and that it has had “mixed” 
results in the supply of urban water services (Richard and Triche, 1994: 4). More 
recently, the World Bank has admitted that it would be wrong 
 
to conclude that government should give up and leave everything to the 
private sector. […] If individuals are left to their own devices, they will 
not provide levels of education and health that they collectively desire. 
[…] Not only is this true in theory, but in practice no country has 
achieved significant improvements in child mortality and primary 
education without government involvement. Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, private sector or NGO participation in health, education, and 
infrastructure is not without problems –especially in reaching poor 
people. The extreme position is clearly not desirable (World Bank, 2003: 
10-11).  
 
However, despite this increasing recognition of the lack of theoretical 
consistency and historical-empirical backing for the expansion of PSP, the fact is that 
mainstream WSS policies have been –and are still– informed by the principles derived 
from this approach. The change, however, is coming from the main actors on which 
these policies have relied, as the private water multinationals are retreating from 
developing countries and are openly relinquishing any central role in the achievement 
of the MDGs, especially in the poorest regions. We come back to this later. 
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3. 1. Mainstream WSS in practice 
 
The remaining research objectives aimed at “analysing the continuities and emerging 
trends” reflected in the implementation of the mainstream WSS policies in the case 
studies, “identifying the barriers to and conditions for improving WSS in urban and 
peri-urban areas of developing countries”, and “developing an indicative framework for 
sustainable WSS in developing countries, taking into account the roles of the state, civil 
society, and market forces”. Our main focus here was to unearth the elements of success 
and failure in PSP experiences by contrasting them against the claims in favour of PSP, 
while at the same time highlighting the constraints and opportunities facing the 
implementation of WSS in developing countries independently of the degree of PSP. In 
this regard, it is worth highlighting that the main goal of the research was not merely 
finding individual examples of PSP “success” or “failure”, which it inevitable has also 
done, but to identify the main trends and processes at stake, the barriers and drivers of 
success and failure. We summarize here the main conclusions derived from the case 
studies and the cross-comparative reports. 
 
 
3. 1. 1. Economic-financial trends 
 
The analysis of the economic-financial aspects of the study were centred on issues of 
financial sources of the water utilities, criteria used in setting tariff rates, cost structure, 
revenue margins, the range and orientation of investments, and the key economic and 
social impacts of PSP in the local societies.29 In general, the information for this 
dimension was incomplete given the difficulties facing the partners to access data in 
most cases, for instance on the business plans and financial sources of the private 
companies. Nevertheless, we managed to build an overall picture of the situation and in 
some particular cases like Buenos Aires and, to a lesser extent, the Thames River basin, 
a more complete analysis was possible thanks to better conditions for accessing vital 
information. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                              
29 For the full report on all aspects of this comparative analysis see Azpiazu and Schorr (2004). 
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We present here a synthesis of the main issues: 
 
• revenues from WSS fees –with some variations from case to case– are the most 
important source of funding for WSS operators, whether public, private or 
mixed; 
• direct state subsidies and borrowing are the next most important sources of 
funding; these sources are increasingly becoming a structural component in 
WSS funding; 
• “fresh resources” (own capital) have a significantly lesser role; 
• the financial management in the cases tends to be characterized by 
o lack of transparency (e.g. about how these resources are allocated) 
o and scattered/incomplete information (e.g. about the actual level of 
borrowing of the operators); 
• as a general trend capital formation has been far below than expected, with a 
pattern of 
o recurrent non compliance of investment commitments according to 
contract; 
o renegotiation of contracts to reduce the original investment commitments 
or outright transfer of the commitments back to the public sector; 
• although in most cases the tariff structures have in-built elements of social 
equity, this is counterbalanced by the steep increases characterizing PSP 
concessions and the fact that these increases have had a negative impact on 
income distribution, affecting especially the poor. 
 
Figure 4 represents the prevailing financial arrangements adopted by the WSS 
utilities studied. Leaving aside income from revenues, there is a trend towards variable 
mixes of public sector subsidies and debt as the preferred financial mechanism, while 
some companies have based the financial strategy either entirely on debt (AASA in 
Buenos Aires and Prolagos in the Lakes Region, both private utilities) or exclusively on 
public resources (Athens, a mixed utility, and Cochabamba’s municipal company). 
Only one company reported exclusive own resources, Aguas de Limeira.30 
 
  
                                              
30 However, in this case the information has to be read with caution because the company reports that 65 
percent of its resources proceeds from revenues and did not disclose the origin of the remaining 35 per 
cent. 
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Figure 4. Prevailing financial arrangements in the case studies 
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Tables 6-8 provide a more detailed breakdown of the financial arrangements of 
some companies for which we obtained more accurate data. Table 6 presents the case of 
Aguas Argentinas in Buenos Aires, where the composition of the financial structure 
relies heavily and increasingly on debt, which accounts for over 15 percent of total 
funding.31 This has been a pilot case, praised by PSP promoters like the World Bank as 
a success story and a model to follow.32 However when checking this particular piece of 
information against the claims made originally to expand PSP, for instance that it would 
bring fresh private investment, it can be noticed that contributions of fresh capital from 
the private operator have been a negligible component of the company’s sources of 
funding, composing just 2.6 percent of the total. This is a consistent pattern across the 
different cases, although with variations. We come back to this later. 
  
                                              
31 During the 1990s AASA relied almost exclusively on international financing and acquired debts 
equivalent to one third of its profits (calculated over assets) without taking into account the risk of 
devaluation. When the peso convertibility (1 peso = 1 US$) was cancelled in 2002 the company had debts 
for US$ 650 million, half of which had to be repaid between 2002 and 2003, but after the devaluation 
income from revenues was reduced to US$ 170 million, which led the company to default on its debt in 
2002 (for a more detailed account see Azpiazu and Schorr, 2004). 
32 See, for instance, World Bank, 2003: 168, Box 9.5. 
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Table 6. Sources of funding – AASA (May 1993-December 2001) (in € and %) 
 
Source    € (millions)*  Percentage 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Revenues       2,976.5       78.1 
Net indebtedness increase        577.4       15.2 
Fresh capital from partners          98.1         2.6 
Other financial income         114.5         3.0 
Other             44.2         1.1 
 
Total        3,810.6     100.0 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Azpiazu and Schorr (2004). 
* 1 US$ = € 0.8171 
 
 
Table 7 presents a synthesis of the last few years in the case of RWE-Thames 
Water, the WSS utility serving the Thames River basin in England. In this case, 100 
percent of the funding sources come from revenues and, increasingly, debt, with no 
contribution of the company’s own capital.33 
 
 
Table 7. Source of funding – RWE-Thames Water (April 1999-March 2003) 
             (in € and %) 
 
Source     € (millions)*  Percentage 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Revenues from water supply (A)     3,414      40.7 
Revenues from sewerage (B)     4,665      55.7 
Sub-total revenues (A+B)      8,079      96.4 
Net indebtedness increase (C)         300        3.6 
 
Total (A+B+C)        8,379    100.0 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Azpiazu and Schorr (2004). 
 * £ 1 = € 1.462 
 
 
 
 
                                              
33 For a detailed analysis of the financial performance of the privatized industry in England, see Schofield 
and Shaoul (1997); Shaoul (1998). 
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Finally, Table 8 shows the funding structure of the mixed WSS utility EYDAP 
in Athens, which is part owned by private investors (39 percent of shares). In this case, 
almost 20 percent of the resources proceed from state subsidies, while the remaining is 
obtained from revenues. 
 
 
Table 8. Source of Funding – EYDAP (Athens), 1998-2001 (in € and %) 
 
Source          € (millions)       Percentage 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Revenues from water supply   761  61.8 
Revenues from sewerage   232  18.8 
Sub-total revenues (A)    993  80.6 
Other (including state subsidies) (B)  239  19.4 
Total (A+B)              1,232            100.0 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Azpiazu and Schorr (2004). 
 
 
 
As stated earlier, the importance of public sector direct subsidies is very high, 
including the case of private operators. Box 1 presents some examples from the study 
illustrating the different modalities and levels, which range from massive subsidies in 
the case of the Greek company EYDAP at around 20 percent of total funding, to the 
sale of under priced raw water by the public sector to the private operator in Niterói. 
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Box 1. Direct state subsidies (some examples) 
 
 
Athens: 
          -almost 20% of total income (1998-2001) from direct subsidies  
 
Aguascalientes: 
          -network expansion publicly funded 
          -private operator “rescued” by the public sector after 1994 
           financial crash (undisclosed amount)  
 
England and Wales (for the 10 privatized companies in 1989): 
          -transfer of infrastructure from the state to the private operators at 
a 
            significantly reduced cost (estimated at 10% of the assets’ value) 
          -absorption of debt by the state prior to privatization (around 5 
billion  
           pounds) 
          -“Green Dowry” (cash injection of 1.5 billion pounds) 
          -tax exemption of 1 billion pounds   
    
Cochabamba: 
          -absorption of debt left by the private operator of concession 
cancelled in 
           2000 
         -currently state funding for service operations 
 
Niterói: 
         -Water sold by the public sector to the private operator below 
production  
           costs  
 
Limeira and Tucumán: 
 
         -Social tariff for poor sectors of the population subsidized by the 
public  
          sector 
 
In Aguascalientes, the state stepped in to “rescue” the private operator from 
financial collapse after the 1994 “Tequila” crisis with an undisclosed amount of direct 
subsidy. After that, a new concession contract was signed which passed the bulk of the 
financial burden, especially for infrastructure expansion, back to the public sector. In 
England and Wales, the companies privatized in 1989 were granted huge subsidies in 
the forms of a significant undervaluation of the assets bought by the companies (the 
public infrastructure was sold at around 10 percent of its estimated value), the debts 
accumulated by the public water utilities was cancelled by the state, and a cash injection 
of 1.5 billion pounds and a tax exemption of 1 billion pounds were granted to the 
companies. In Cochabamba, the debts left by the private operator after the cancellation 
of the contract in March 2000 were assumed by the state. 
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These examples of continued state subsidy, unfortunately not amenable to a 
more rigorous quantitative analysis owing to the paucity or inaccessibility of the 
information, tend to disprove the claim that PSP contributes to the financial relief of the 
public sector. The evidence suggests that contrary to the claim, WSS utilities continue 
to rely on public funding whether through direct subsidies or other forms. 
 
Box 2. Indebtedness (some examples) 
 
 
Niterói: 
 
          In 2001-3, about 50% of infrastructure investment, around 45 million  
          dollars, was funded with loans from the National Development Bank 
          (BNDES) 
 
Prolagos: 
 
          In 2002 the company received loans for a total of 38 million dollars from  
          different sources (including 22 million dollars from the Federal Economic  
          Bank [Caixa]), while its annual turnover is 8 million dollars    
  
Cochabamba: 
 
           Between 1999 and 2003 total indebtedness reached over 160% of total  
           turnover 
           However, while in 1999-2000 the ratio debt/turnover was 4 to 1, this was  
           reduced in 2002-3 by 50% (2 to 1) after state take over of the company 
 
England and Wales (10 companies): 
 
           The total level of indebtedness of the privatized WSS is now around 19  
           billion pounds (2004), from 0 in 1989 
 
 
Subsidies and debt are becoming increasingly a structural component of the 
funding schemes of the WSS, whether public, private or mixed. Box 2 presents some 
examples of indebtedness. As a trend, the level of debt of some companies, notoriously 
private operators, can be several times higher than their total revenue, like in the cases 
of Prolagos (almost five times in 2002), Aguas del Tunari in Cochabamba (during its 
short-lived concession this operator had a 4 to 1 ratio of debt over turnover) or Aguas 
Argentinas after the 2002 devaluation, as already discussed. 
From another angle, one of the most important arguments in favour of PSP has 
been the need for investment in infrastructure renewal and expansion, which according 
to PSP promoters could only be provided by the private sector. However, as illustrated 
by Table 9 the evidence shows that there is a consistent pattern of non compliance by 
private operators with contractual commitments related to investment in infrastructure, 
which is also reinforced by the systematic renegotiation of contracts to change (in 
general to reduce) the original investment commitments on behalf of private operators. 
This is compounded by the fact that the bulk of investments have been concentrated in 
water supply projects, to the continued neglect of wastewater collection, treatment and 
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disposal. Table A1 in the Appendix A2 presents a synthesis of these findings and we 
will come back to this with concrete examples when considering the techno-
infrastructural dimension. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Investment commitments and degree of compliance (examples) 
 
Lack of compliance (in 2002 the investment was 3 
million dollars); The expansion targets set in the 
contract had already been achieved before the 
concession was granted
Aguas de Limeira
98 million dollars (35% in the first 5 years)
No investments were made before the collapse of 
the concession in 2000
Aguas de Tunari (Cochabamba) (1999-
2000)
214 million dollars projected
Trend of non-compliance since 2000 (the state is 
in charge of providing 60% of the investment)
EYDAP (Athens)
1200 million euros for the period 2000-08
Almost zero compliance until cancellation of the 
concession
Aguas del Aconquija (Tucumán) (1995-7)
Universalization of water supply by 2003 and 
sewerage by 2008 
Between 1993 and 1999
1047 million dollars
According to the regulator ETOSS the degree of 
non compliance was 42% during the period 1993-
1998 and 33% for the period 1999-2002
Aguas Argentinas (Buenos Aires)
Investment of 3.935 million dollars over 30 years 
(1993-)
Investments committed by contract Actual investments
 
Regarding tariffs structures and the criteria used for setting tariffs, these seem to 
be largely determined by the level of metering. Figure 5 charts some examples 
according to the level of metering and the type of tariff system. 
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     Figure 5. Tariff structures in a sample of cases 
 
 
Metered WSS Unmetered WSS
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Niterói 
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Thames Basin
Predominance of 
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(in principle)
Predominance of 
“mixed” tariff 
systems
 
The evidence suggests that in most cases there is a progressive rate structure, 
which accounts for issues of social equity and affordability (Appendix A2, Table A2). 
However, the actual degree of progressiveness is very different across the different 
cases and tends to be counterbalanced by other factors, such as the evolution of rates 
and their actual incidence on income distribution. Thus, although in most cases low-
income consumers tend to be protected by the progressive rates, in practice rate 
increases tend to be more detrimental to consumers with the lowest income, with the 
resulting regressive implications in distributive terms. In this connection, when 
comparing the indexing mechanisms of the tariff rates34 with some indicator like the 
evolution of consumer prices or other inflation measurements, in all cases the 
introduction of PSP has been expressed in steep tariff increases well above inflation 
(Azpiazu and Schorr, 2004: 20-5). In the case of England and Wales, for instance, after 
growing public dissatisfaction with the combination of steep tariff increases, high 
                                              
34 The indexing mechanisms identified in the cases include ordinary and extraordinary revisions of the 
rates, adjustments to compensate for cost increases, indexation according to the evolution of the domestic 
inflation rate (or, as in the case of AASA in Buenos Aires, according to US inflation), or periodic 
revisions to transfer part of the productive or microeconomic gains –more appropriately, of the monopoly 
profits– to users and consumers (as in the case of England and Wales, where rate regulation is price cap 
type). 
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dividends paid to shareholders, millionaire salary packages for water industry 
executives and ostensible failure to comply with investment commitments, the 
economic regulator sanctioned a reduction of tariffs by an average 12 percent for the 
period 1999-2004. However, the most significant case is AASA in Buenos Aires, where 
between 1993 and 2002 the tariff increased by 88 percent against a 7 percent raise in 
consumer prices during the same period, and owing to very different political and 
economic conditions the regulator has not been able to enforce similar compensatory 
measures as it happened in England and Wales. We come back to these issues later on. 
 
 
3. 1. 2. Infrastructural and environmental performance 
 
Another aspect considered relates to infrastructure efficiency and environmental 
performance of the water utilities. Regarding the first, we examined diverse parameters 
related to the performance of the water utilities in the abstraction, conveyance and 
treatment of raw water, the distribution of drinking water, user management 
technologies, and the collection, treatment and disposal of wastewater. These indicators 
were used to compare the different water utilities in order to identify any trends that 
may clearly relate efficiency in the techno-infrastructural dimension with the type of 
operator, public or private, and thus contributing to the evaluation of the claims made in 
the mainstream literature. 
Despite the claims made in the specialized literature promoting PSP as the best 
option to enhance efficiency in the WSS infrastructure, the evidence suggests that 
private utilities tend to perform as poorly as public entities in most stages of the 
process, such as in controlling physical water losses. In this regard, the evidence shows 
that even when the water operators have been able to improve the commercial 
efficiency and increase revenue, investment in infrastructure renewal continues to lag 
well behind. In general, water utilities tend to budget operation and expansion costs 
while the existing infrastructure is mainly considered from the perspective of 
maintenance, even in cases where the operators are obliged by contract to renew 
pipelines and there is strict regulation in place. However, the evidence from our case 
study material shows that strict regulation and monitoring of compliance with 
contractual commitments has been the exception rather than the rule, and consequently 
the lack of investment in infrastructure renewal continues to underscore the loss of large 
volumes of water in most cities. 
Thus, although one of the reasons often given for introducing PSP is the need 
for huge investments in renewing obsolete infrastructures built but ill maintained by the 
public sector, in fact private companies have systematically failed to comply with 
contractual commitments in this area and tend to concentrate their investments in 
improving the commercial aspects of the business. In this regard, private companies 
have substantially improved in certain cases the user management technologies and 
infrastructure, in particular commercial aspects such as billing and fee collection, and 
also expanding coverage to include new customers. In the cases of Brazil (Limeira, 
Niterói and the Lakes Region), Buenos Aires, and Aguascalientes, for instance, the 
private companies have made substantial progress in improving user databases. In the 
last two cases, sophisticated computer systems have been developed that automatically 
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register high precision micrometers, which greatly facilitates the updating of the users 
register as well as keeping a meticulous control over consumption and billing of water 
services. The private operations in the Kenyan cases of Nyeri and Tala have also 
reported significant improvements in overall user management, from registration to 
metering and billing, although they have started from a very low level and the situation 
remains extremely weak in comparison with the other developing country cases in Latin 
America. 
 Nevertheless, the increasing sophistication in user management systems is 
counterbalanced in some cases by the low proportion of metered connections (e.g. 
around 20 percent in the Thames River basin and 15 percent in Buenos Aires) and by 
technical, social, and political problems arising from the implementation of these 
technologies. Moreover, there has been a clear imbalance between the efforts made to 
improve the commercial efficiency of the companies and enhancing the overall 
efficiency of the system including consumer satisfaction. Despite frequent references by 
the private companies to high levels of consumer satisfaction, there have been 
increasing conflicts deriving from the widespread dissatisfaction caused by the rising 
efficiency in billing and fee collection –accompanied by steep increases in water fees– 
which are often not matched with higher service quality. For instance, in Buenos Aires 
the regulator ETOSS and the Ombudsman have had to intervene very frequently owing 
to rising users protests, and have detected important problems in the implementation of 
the new user management technologies. These include errors in registration and billing, 
meters which overestimate consumption, unjustified payment orders, and similar 
problems, which have led to the repeated application of fines and other sanctions by the 
authorities and have even reached the Supreme Court of Justice. In Aguascalientes, 
problems have arisen because the poor condition of the distribution network causes that 
the pipes carry a mixture of water and air, which means that air is counted by the meters 
and is charged for in the water bills. This has affected in particular the most deprived 
sectors of the population, who live in areas of the city where the condition of the 
network is very poor and the water pressure is very low, and for whom the water bill 
represents a very high proportion of their household income. Thus, a survey carried 
recently by the municipality found that despite of the high level of coverage (98 
percent), and that there is an overall good evaluation of the service (7.4 points out of 
10), one third of the users complained that their drinking water supply was intermittent 
and unreliable while invoicing and fee collection were carried out by the private 
operator with disregard for these basic quality problems.  
Also, private companies tend to have more deficient indicators for sanitation 
services (sewers and drainage), which continues to be neglected showing very low 
coverage levels, and poor infrastructure efficiency in the conveyance, treatment, and 
safe disposal of wastewater. These conditions are aggravated by the lack of investment 
and innovation in alternatives less costly than conventional treatment plants, which 
would be more suitable for expanding services to the poor but that seem to be less 
attractive for private operators. 
However, given the characteristics of the available information and other factors 
the evaluation of this dimension has to be interpreted with caution, because it shows a 
static picture of a long-term process. As already discussed, even the companies 
classified as “mature” in Table 5 are really youngsters in relation to the lifecycle of the 
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infrastructures and socio-environmental processes that they are currently managing. For 
instance, the fact that today a company is “private” only reflects its current status in 
terms of ownership or management regime, but it does not tell us if the processes 
underlying the efficiency scores assigned in Table 10 below were the result of public or 
private efforts or failures. Only in the case of the Finnish municipalities Lahti and 
Kangasala the scores can be clearly related to the type of operator, given that they have 
been running the services for several decades as public entities. In other cases, the 
successes and failures now represented in the high or low efficiency scores are the 
result of a complex interweaving of factors whereby it is difficult to disentangle public 
from private responsibilities. However, taking into account the original arguments put 
forward to promote PSP in the sector, in particular the claim that it would enhance 
efficiency in infrastructure, the table offers a useful synchronic synthesis of the state of 
the systems that complements our overall evaluation of PSP. With these warnings in 
mind, let us now consider the scores for average efficiency resulting from the analysis 
of this dimension.35 
 
               Table 10. Level of overall efficiency according to type of operator 
Case Study Type of administration Average efficiency 
Lahti Public  2.67 
Thames River basin Private  2.5036 
Athens Mixed  2.50 
Limeira Private  2.33 
Kangasala Public  2.33 
Aguascalientes Private  2.17 
Buenos Aires Private  2.00 
Tucumán Public*  1.80 
Niterói Private  1.80 
Nyeri Private  1.75 
Tala Private  1.33 
Dar es Salaam Private  1.20 
Cochabamba Public**  1.00 
 
*     Failed private concession (1995-1997) taken over by the provincial government. 
**   Failed private concession (1999-2000), taken over by the municipal government.  
                                              
35 See Torregrosa et. al. (2004). 
36 This high score for RWE-Thames Water is controversial, but we have used here the available official 
information about the operator’s performance provided by the economic regulator OFWAT. From 
additional information gathered from the case study, including recent reports from the regulators, it seems 
that the actual efficiency level of the company is much lower, in particular because it has a consistent 
worsening performance in terms of leakage control and sewer renewal since 1998-99.  
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The table suggests that the most efficient systems among our case studies are 
those serving Lahti, with an autonomous municipal operator, the Thames River basin 
with a private operator (but see footnote), and Athens, a public operator that recently 
floated 39 percent of its shares in the financial market to incorporate PSP. The 
hierarchy of cases below shows that both private and public operators tend to have 
regular or poor infrastructure efficiency. That many public sector utilities in the 
developing world, especially in very poor countries, tend to have very low efficiency 
levels is a well established fact.37 However, what this table shows is that one of the key 
arguments used to promote PSP in the water and sanitation sector since the 1980s, that 
it would help to enhance the efficiency of infrastructure, cannot be substantiated with 
evidence. When we consider the infrastructure efficiency for all the stages involved in 
the cycle of producing water for human consumption, from raw water intake to safe 
disposal of wastewater, the top performing operators tend to be public entities, which is 
reinforced by the fact that several indicators that allow some of the private companies to 
score high efficiency levels in Table 10 were actually achieved under public sector 
ownership and management, as in the cases of the Thames River basin38 and Limeira.39   
In fact, the evidence suggests that private operators have not managed to reach 
and maintain top performance levels even after 15 years of operation, as observed in the 
case of RWE-Thames Water. In Buenos Aires, after 11 years of operation and despite 
important achievements performance levels have been well behind the targets agreed in 
the concession contract and, even after several contract renegotiations that reduced the 
original investment commitments of the private company, the revised targets have not 
been accomplished either. In other cases like Nyeri, deficient structural conditions in 
place when private administration began operating have not been reverted after six 
years. Tucumán and Cochabamba are perhaps among the best examples of the very 
negative impact that PSP might have in developing countries, as not only the private 
operators did not bring in fresh investment to renew and expand infrastructure, but are 
trying to make the respective countries pay a compensation for lost profits and expenses 
                                              
37 However, the also well established fact that many public operators in both developing and developed 
countries have top levels of infrastructure efficiency has been largely ignored or neglected in the 
literature promoting PSP in the water and sanitation sector. And yet, in Brazil and Mexico –to take 
countries covered by PRINWASS–, after around 10 years of PSP experience in the WSS sector, the best 
performing utilities are public: SABESP (the state water utility of Sao Paulo) and DMAE (the municipal 
water company of Porto Alegre, in Rio Grande do Sul), among others in Brazil, and the state water 
company of Nuevo León SADM in the case of Mexico. 
38 For instance, as already discussed, full coverage for drinking water and sewerage connections in 
England and Wales, and particularly in the Thames River basin, was achieved several decades ago under 
public sector management. 
39 In Limeira, after a review of irregularities in the concession contract started in 1995 it was found that 
the original targets set for the private operator (expanding coverage up to 95 and 80 percent of the 
population for drinking water and sewerage respectively) had already been widely surpassed under public 
management: by 1994 coverage levels were already 97 percent for drinking water and 95 percent for 
sewerage. A similar situation happened in Niterói with the targets set to the private operator in relation to 
sewerage coverage (Vargas, 2003: 32). 
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derived from the collapse of the concessions,40 which if granted by the relevant 
international tribunal (ICSID) would further aggravate the already difficult situation 
facing these two countries as a result of their recurrent financial and political crises. 
Nevertheless, the reader should not jump to any precipitated conclusions on the 
basis of the analysis presented in this section. In particular, it is clear that comparing 
small municipal water utilities from a country with such high technological standards 
and wealth as those characterizing Finnish cities with the water utilities serving very 
large world metropolises like London, Buenos Aires and Athens, or with the small 
companies serving towns in Sub-Saharan Africa requires caution and detachment in the 
analysis. Moreover, additional factors that cannot be adequately considered here, such 
as the geographical characteristics of the cases or the structural problems affecting the 
regions where they are located may be more important than the type of administration 
of water systems in explaining the observed levels of infrastructure efficiency. Lastly, 
all case studies reported difficulties for obtaining reliable information on basic aspects 
such as withdrawal, distribution, and consumption of water, investment in infrastructure 
and technology, and other crucial issues. In many cases, essential information such as 
the contractual commitments regarding investment in infrastructure are not available for 
consultation, and in some cases not even the regulators have access to this 
documentation, having to rely on digested information released by the private operators. 
This is a serious problem affecting the possibility of any rigorous assessment of policy 
in the sector, and has significant consequences for the effective governance of WSS, as 
discussed later. 
The problems of infrastructure considered above are closely related to the 
environmental performance of the utilities. Here, in addition to the already mentioned 
problems of paucity of data, and lack of access to basic information, an additional factor 
seems to help explaining the information gap: lack of environmental information is 
partly a consequence of lack of serious environmental management initiatives across 
the cases.41 Another important caveat is that urban areas in different natural settings and 
with different socio-economic trajectories may face very different environmental 
challenges. For example, for a WSS system in a dry region depending on limited 
groundwater supplies like Aguascalientes, leakage control and improvements in the 
distribution system are very important. In comparison, for a WSS system located in a 
well-resourced river basin like Buenos Aires leakage control may be less important 
while tackling surface water pollution and enhancing wastewater management are 
urgent priorities. 
                                              
40 In the case of Cochabamba, the private operator was actually a “ghost” company based in the Cayman 
Islands with a capital of US$ 2,000, when it was granted in concession a municipal company with assets 
worth US$ 100 million. In both cases, after the collapse of the concessions, the private operators are 
suing the respective governments in concept of “lost profits” and other items for US$ 300 million and 
US$ 30 million, respectively for Tucumán and Cochabamba. 
41 And collection and analysis of primary data for a more in-depth analysis of utilities’ environmental 
initiatives was not possible given the limited resources available. Nevertheless, the study offered an 
assessment framework that can provide a platform for future inter-comparative research, perhaps a Life 
Cycle Assessment (or other indicators- benchmarking system) tailored to the local contexts. 
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For these and other reasons it might well be argued that an assessment of 
environmental performance and impacts alone is misleading, even meaningless. 
Environmental improvements with an excessive social or economic cost are not 
necessarily desirable. For instance, in some cases it could be unfair to assess negatively 
the performance of a WSS operator because environmental standards are not met in 
their area, if enhancing performance is made unfeasible because a large number of users 
may not be able to afford the cost of environmental improvements and there is no 
provision for state funding or other alternative resources. Similarly, should an 
improvement in an environmental aspect (e.g. reduction of aggregate water 
consumption volumes and consequently reduced abstraction from water sources) be 
judged positively if it has been achieved to the detriment of social sustainability (e.g. if 
rising prices lead to increased levels of disconnection or decreased consumption from 
poorer households)? 
On another count, “efficiency” focussing on discounted monetary costs is not a 
more adequate indicator either. This type of measurement masks non-monetarisable 
environmental and social costs, especially those externalised by the operator and those 
passed to the future. The best approach would be one in which disaggregated indicators 
covering a range of dimensions form part of an overall evaluation matrix providing the 
empirical ground upon which a politicised debate can then take place (Martinez-Alier, 
et. al., 1998), which is the approach towards which this project aims to make a 
contribution. 
Taking into account these considerations, let us say that in the analysis of this 
dimension we took into account indicators such as reduction of unaccounted-for water 
(UFW), demand management and conservation strategies, wastewater management, and 
environmental planning and policy.42 The evidence gathered in this part of the study 
tends to be consistent with the findings of the techno-infrastructural and economic-
financial dimensions: the introduction of PSP can be linked with improvements in the 
commercial aspects of WSS, such as a reduction of UFW, the extension of metering, 
and a shift from fixed to volumetric tariffs (often accompanied by an increase of 
prices). In this regard, this analysis confirms that the reduction of UFW associated with 
PSP is primarily due to improvements in metering (curbing illegal or unmetered uses 
and replacing faulty meters), but not with the reduction of physical losses. Also, the 
introduction of PSP has not enhanced the capacity for controlling water demand nor has 
it led to considerable innovation with respect to water saving technologies or water 
demand management activities. There is no evidence that the introduction of PSP has 
led to the implementation of conservation tariffs. The lack of committed demand 
controlling measures (other than metering) is evident. In none of the cities are there 
specific water demand management measures implemented (e.g. retrofits/rebates, 
conservation tariffs, efficient landscaping, water audits, use of secondary sources, etc.), 
or even considered. 
Although there has been an important increase of investments in sewerage 
collection and treatment in all cases considered, only in one of the seven cases 
                                              
42 The cases considered are: Aguascalientes, Athens, Buenos Aires, Dar es Salaam, Aguas de Limeira, 
Aguas de Niterói, and Nyeri, Kenya. 
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examined there was PSP in financing and construction. In the others, it was the result of 
governmental action and public (or external donor) subsidisation. Sludge management, 
energy efficiency, nature conservation and other non-core environmental services 
remain outside the scope of the examined WSS utilities, even after the introduction of 
PSP. From another angle, there is no evidence that PSP introduces noticeable 
improvements in environmental planning, in making environmental information 
available to the public (transparency), or in developing activities to raise environmental 
awareness among the users and the public in general. Planning is still based on demand 
forecasts and supply works, and there is no evidence of integrated resource planning 
processes (i.e. considering demand and supply alternatives on an equal footing). 
 
 
3. 1. 3. Socio-economic and demo-geographic trends 
 
The problems highlighted above regarding infrastructural and environmental aspects are 
intimately related with the situation observed in relation to the socio-economic and 
demo-geographic aspects affecting the provision of WSS. These aspects of the study 
were aimed at the identification of common problems and challenges affecting the cities 
included in the research by looking both at inter-city and intra-city heterogeneities. 
While inter-city differentiation is often associated with scale, intra-urban cleavages are 
often the result of acute social polarization, which in the case of WSS is expressed in 
differential patterns of access to the services, in particular problems of coverage, 
affordability, and service quality. In this perspective, demographic and socio-economic 
processes are not just contexts of WSS policies but also structural components that 
underscore much of the challenges and opportunities facing the provision of these 
services. 
Among other crucial findings it is worth highlighting some characteristics and 
patterns that are shared by all developing country cases, like the increasing 
environmental degradation affecting peri-urban areas where the poor are concentrated. 
Access to drinking water and sanitation services is very difficult in these areas, which is 
compounded by the weak integration of these territories in the activities of urban 
planning and management. As a result, it is possible to identify an increasing social and 
spatial polarization of the population in relation to the basic living standards associated 
with modern urban life, and particularly the differential access to drinking water and 
sanitation and other essential goods and services. These trends represent a crucial 
constraint for the implementation of the WSS programmes based on the promotion of 
PSP. Increasing socio-economic inequalities, poverty, deprivation, and spatial 
segregation hinder the possibility of success of for-profit private sector providers, who 
do not find particularly attractive supplying WSS to the poorest sectors of the 
population. These sectors usually cannot afford paying for WSS services at the rates 
needed to make the system profitable for multinational private corporations, which in 
addition are very reluctant to invest in the expansion and maintenance of the networks 
in poor areas owing to the high financial risk involved. These findings are consistent 
with the conclusions of other studies, and the problems identified are increasingly 
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recognized by the main promoters of PSP expansion in the water sector and also by the 
multinational water utilities that have been at the forefront of these policies.43 
In this regard, the configuration of human settlements and their patterns of 
development and geographical distribution are major factors affecting the management 
of water resources and WSS. They underpin some of the most important challenges 
facing the policies aimed at achieving universal access to drinking water and sanitation 
services as expressed in Millennium Development Goals, and constitute significant 
factors determining the chances of success and failure of PSP in the sector (UNDP-
World Bank, 1999). For instance, varying patterns of urban concentration are expressed 
in differential needs in relation to the extension, repair and maintenance of the WSS 
networks, as reflected for instance in the observed association between high population 
density and ageing networks. At the same time, the association between population 
density and water demand (Ghisham and Fleming, 1989: 35-42), which sometimes may 
be boosted by higher needs derived from the maintenance of public spaces (Douglas, 
1983), tends to be increasingly mediated by technological advances (such as water 
recycling and rainwater harvesting for non drinking water uses). However, the 
heterogeneous relationships that can be observed between demographic density and 
impact on water resources and WSS is not limited to variations between cities with 
different population size but is also an intra-urban whereby the ethnic, age, gender, and 
class cleavages underpin the spatial distribution of social groups in the urban space. 
As observed earlier, the cases considered in the research have very different 
characteristics, ranging from global cities like London to small towns in Finland and 
Africa, and with highly diverse material conditions (see Table 4). However, there are 
some common patterns worth highlighting. For instance, despite the striking differences 
separating large metropolises like London, Buenos Aires, and Athens they share some 
common traits like the dispersal of middle-aged population towards residential 
suburban areas, the segregated concentration of poor migrants above the national 
average in the cases of Athens and London –especially in the inner city 
neighbourhoods–, and processes of polarization of the urban space with degradation of 
a substantial share of the housing stock (London) and the widespread deterioration of 
the WSS infrastructure (Buenos Aires, London). In the medium-sized cities, like 
Tucumán, Aguascalientes, or the Brazilian cases of Niterói, Limeira and the Lakes 
Region, there is a common trend of metropolization which increases the demand for 
urban services and employment. On the other hand, the urban space is reconfigured 
with the expanding population, disorganized urban growth, and the segregation of poor 
rural migrants who settle in unserviced areas, often unfit for human occupation. These 
spaces are weakly integrated in the processes of urban planning and management, and 
have a pattern of poor or null provision of basic utilities and a degraded environment. In 
general, the expanding population in these poor areas has no access to safe WSS, but 
their low capacity to pay for commercialized WSS renders these settlements 
unattractive for private sector operators. 
                                              
43 See reports D21 (Castro, 2004) and D20 (Azpiazu and Schorr, 2004). The World Bank has recently 
recognized that “private providers fail to reach the very poor” (World Bank, 2003: 8), and global private 
water companies have started to recognize this fact as well. 
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From another angle, in all cases it was possible to observe clear trends of 
increasing social inequality, which are expressed in the form of highly polarized urban 
spaces especially with regard to basic infrastructure and essential services. These 
findings are consistent with the available evidence suggesting that since the late 1980s 
there has been a significant increase in the patterns of social inequality and 
defenselessness affecting particularly the most vulnerable sectors of the population in 
developing countries.44 In turn, these patterns of worsening inequality constitute one of 
the most formidable obstacles for the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals, while also representing a major potential source of social conflict. Moreover, the 
convergence of these negative forces presents a serious challenge for the programmes 
promoting private sector involvement in the WSS examined by this project. Let us 
briefly consider here the patterns of unemployment, regressive income distribution, and 
poverty.  
 
 
3. 1. 3. 1. Unemployment, income distribution, and poverty patterns 
 
Chart 2 represents the unemployment growth that took place during the 1990s in 
selected cities, with rates that in most cases were above 10 percent of the economically 
active population and more than double that figure in the case of the Buenos Aires 
suburban area (see Box 3 for more detailed examples). Aguascalientes provides a 
contrast due to its low unemployment, although in recent years the indicators have been 
worsening in this city too. However, these overall trends hide the fact that 
unemployment has no homogenous spatial and social distribution in the territories 
under consideration, with some areas of the cities recording higher unemployment rates, 
particularly those where the most vulnerable sectors tend to be concentrated. 
 
 
  
                                              
44 See, for instance, IDB (1998); Perry et. al (2003); McGranahan et. al (2001) . 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page51 
Chart 2. Evolution of unemployment rates in selected cases (1971-2003) 
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         Box 3. Unemployment patterns 
In London and Buenos Aires there have been significant changes that represent an inversion of historical trends: these cities had historically lower unemployment  
rates than their countries’ average, but since the 1990s the situation has been reversed suggesting worsening employment conditions.  
In Tucuman, while in the 1970s and 1980s the unemployment rate fluctuated between 10.6 and 8 percent, from the early 1990s there was a rapid increase of 
unemployment. In 1995 the rate reached a peak 20 percent, remaining stable for a few years until May 2002 when the figures reached 23 percent. 
Aguascalientes has experienced a decline in the rate of GDP, especially in the manufacturing sector, and a steady reduction of public and private investment in job 
creation since 1999. This has been compounded by inflationary pressures above the national average. 
In the case of Athens, there has been a twin process of relative deindustrialisation of the city and growth of the unemployment rate. These changes have taken place in 
the context of a wider European trend of economic restructuring, and are related to the efforts made by Greece to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU), which 
required stricter control of public sector employment. Athens had historically low unemployment rates, fewer than 5 percent during the 1970s and 1980s, but these 
have increased to 8.6 percent in 1991 and 12.2 percent in the year 2000, above the national and European average rates for that year of 11.1 percent and 8.4 percent 
respectively. 
However, unemployment rates are also unevenly distributed across social and geographical sectors. As a general pattern, poverty, deprivation, and unemployment 
tend to affect the most vulnerable sectors broadly composed of ethnic minorities, the youth, women (in some cases), unskilled workers, and those without property. 
When these characteristics of vulnerability are combined, people are more likely to be unemployed. For instance, in 1996 20 percent of the unemployed in London 
lived in the 10 most deprived districts, and 25 percent were under 25 years old. Those who were older, particularly men, had suffered from long-term unemployment 
(the metropolis has one of the highest proportions of people demanding unemployment benefits in the country). Also, according to the 1991 census non-white 
Londoners were 2 to 3 times more likely to become unemployed than their white counterparts. In 1997-1998, while the proportion of minority ethnic groups in the 
economically active population was 27 percent in Inner London and 19 percent in Outer London, their unemployment rates were 47 percent y 32 percent respectively. 
Recent research suggests shows that despite a sustained economic growth, the situation has substantially worsened since 1997 for the most vulnerable sectors (GLA, 
2002). 
In 2002 the City of Buenos Aires’ unemployment rate was 16.3 percent compared to 24.2 percent in the Buenos Aires Suburban Area, which has a rate above the 
national average. However, unemployment in the suburban area has also an unequal distribution, with the highest rates observed in municipalities with the least 
favourable living conditions. Thus, while in the better districts the unemployment rate was 19.7 percent, in the most deprived areas the figure was 26.8 percent. 
London displays a similar distribution pattern of unemployment. The overall unemployment rate for the city in 2001 was 6.7 percent, above the national average at 
5.2 percent. However while Inner London had a rate of 8.9 percent, Outer London was closer to the national average with 5.4 percent. Nevertheless, Eastern Inner 
London has even higher unemployment, with some boroughs recording rates of 12.3 percent and 11.8 percent. 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page53 
 
From another angle, unemployment does not tell us anything about the type and 
quality of the employment relationship, for instance if the available employment is 
relatively stable or well paid. In this regard, in a large number of the cases considered in 
this research there has been a significant increase of job precariousness and informality 
(in all cases affecting above 50 percent of the employed), mainly un-registered jobs,45 
short-term jobs, part-time contracts, and overtime work. In some cases the labour 
market is also characterized by important seasonal changes.46 In general, high 
unemployment rates combined with structural unemployment deprive people and 
households of stable income, which weakens their consumption and payment capacities. 
Even social sectors that have some saving capacity are affected because these savings 
are often destined to support unemployed members of the household, which is 
particularly important in developing countries with little or no unemployment benefits 
and also in developed countries in the case of illegal workers, which compose a 
significant share of the population in some cases like Athens. Likewise, in the case of 
unstable or intermittent employment, normally low paid and without social benefits, 
people and households are under pressure to prioritize the ways in which they use their 
income, which is normally directed primarily at essential consumption in food and 
housing (in these cases the rent tends to have a considerable weight in total expenses), 
while expenses in other important areas such as health, education, and personal 
pensions tend to be postponed. This is connected with the problem of income 
distribution, which constitutes an indicator of the capacity of households to afford 
expenses in essential services like WSS and sustain their living standards. 
In this regard, the analysis shows that most case studies record a regressive 
pattern of income distribution affecting in particular the households with the lowest 
income and living in the most precarious social conditions, which has increased existing 
inequalities in the consumption and payment capacity of these sectors. These worsening 
conditions provide elements for an explanation of the difficulties experienced by many 
households in the payment of essential public services such as WSS, as it has been 
observed in several case studies. Nevertheless, despite the mounting evidence indicating 
increasing income inequality and persistent poverty among important sectors of the 
population, as already mentioned in all cases studied the WSS tariffs have been 
significantly increased, often at rates several times higher than the overall rates of 
inflation and wages. 
For instance, in Cochabamba, after the concession was granted in 1999 the private 
company increased water bills by an average 35 percent, which affected especially the 
poorest users as the minimum charge came to represent almost 22 percent of the 
minimum wage. As well known, the social and political impact of this policy was 
catastrophic, contributing to fuelling the mass protests that led to the cancellation of the 
concession with the private operator and the withdrawal of the entire federal cabinet in 
                                              
45 Employment not registered in the social security schemes, sometimes called “black market” 
employment or undeclared employment, which excludes pension benefits. 
46 This is the case in the Lakes Region, where the economy is mainly based on tourism and is subject to 
significant seasonal variations in employment and income. 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page54 
March 2000. In Kenya, a survey carried out in Tala in 2002 found that households were 
using between 5 and 9 percent of their income to pay for water bills, and the same 
survey applied to water users in both cities studied (Tala and Nyeri) showed high 
dissatisfaction with  the impact of tariff increases on family income. In Buenos Aires, 
between the start of the concession in 1993 and 2002 the private company increased 
water bills by 88.2 percent compared to increases of 7.3 percent in the consumer price 
index and 8.9 percent in the wholesale price index during the same period. These tariff 
increases had a stronger negative impact on the poorer sectors of the population, 
contributing to the worsening inequality gap: in the Greater Buenos Aires, the poorer 10 
percent of the population spends in average 9 percent of total income in their WSS bill, 
while for the average consumer the proportion is 1.9 percent. 
In Aguascalientes, after the concession was granted in 1993 the tariff was 
increased by 10 percent every 2 months during the first year. After the private company 
had to be “rescued” from default by the government in 1994, the tariff increases needed 
to make the operation commercially viable were deemed to be politically unfeasible, 
given that over two thirds of the customer base of the company is classified as low 
income. Also, in addition to the impact of tariff increases that has accompanied the 
introduction of PSP in the water and sanitation sector, the most vulnerable groups of 
users have been also burdened by fixed charges to get connected to the network, which 
are an additional factor of exclusion give the high cost of these charges. In some of the 
case studies is has been detected that the impossibility to afford these charges to get 
connected have operated as a limiting factor by discouraging people from demanding 
access to WSS, thus abating the level of conflict that could have been otherwise 
expected. We have called this phenomenon “self limiting citizenship”, as people seem 
to forsake the notion of universal right to these essential services. 
However, problems of affordability and non payment are not the exclusive 
preserve of developing country cities, and issues of inequality and deprivation also 
underscore similar situations in wealthy places like London. In this city, the WSS tariffs 
increased by 95 percent between 1989 and 1999, and between 1990 and 1995 the 
number of pre-summons notices sent by the private companies to households in arrears 
rose by 900 percent. In 1994, almost 2 million households (near 9 percent of the total) 
defaulted on their water bills, but this figure has risen to 20 percent of total households 
in 2004. According to government estimations, between 2-4 million households are 
living in “water poverty” given the weight of the WSS bill in their total household 
income.  
Regarding poverty, access to WSS is one of the most important indicators in the 
strategies adopted by the international community for poverty alleviation and human 
development. In this regard, the evolution of poverty patterns in the cities studied 
reflects their association with a high unemployment rate, employment instability and 
precariousness, and a reduction of individual and household income. As a trend, the 
evidence suggests that average poverty levels and socio-economic inequality have 
increased in most cases since the 1990s, although there are important differences in the 
extent and depth of the process in the different locations. In principle, the cities can be 
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divided into two groups47: a first group composed by Dar es Salaam, Nyeri and Tala 
Town (Kenya), Cochabamba, Tucumán, and Resistencia characterized by a higher 
proportion of the population living under the poverty line. The second group includes 
London, Buenos Aires, Athens, Aguascalientes, Niterói, Limeira, and the Lakes region, 
which record a lower proportion of the population living in poverty. 
When this initial classification of the cities is broken down through the analysis of 
the cleavages and processes of intra-urban differentiation, the existence of important 
pockets of poverty and deprivation even in the wealthiest urban areas is revealed. 
Certain areas in the Buenos Aires conurbation and in the relatively wealthy Brazilian 
municipalities record levels of poverty and extreme poverty similar to those observed in 
the poorer cities of Tucumán, Resistencia, while some parts of Cochabamba have very 
similar conditions to those found in the poor districts of Kenya and Tanzania included 
in the study. Regarding poverty patterns, there has been a clear trend of deterioration 
during the 1990s, including in cities like Athens which had enjoyed high levels of social 
cohesion and relative well being. There is also a clear pattern of increasing inequality 
and polarization, which can be observed in most cities even where overall poverty has 
been declining, like in Cochabamba. In most cases, the most deprived sectors of the 
population tend to concentrate in the worst serviced parts of the urban space and record 
the highest levels of unemployment, employment instability and precariousness, and 
income inequality. 
At the same time, these social conditions are often worsened and magnified by the 
political and economic instability generated by social confrontations among the most 
powerful social sectors, as it has been recently the case in Argentina. These tensions 
have been also exacerbated by the increasing integration of these countries into the 
world market, and by the processes of deregulation and liberalization of the national 
economies now exposed to the fluctuations and crises generated by increasing 
competition, and largely uncontrolled global capital flows. The process of PSP 
expansion in the water and sanitation sector is part and parcel of these global 
transformations, and we are exploring here some of the impacts that these processes are 
having at the level of regions, cities, and neighbourhoods. The urban-spatial 
characteristics of the case studies are closely related to the above examined patterns of 
inequality and polarization, which find expression on high levels of intra urban 
differentiation and segregation regarding the social and material living conditions. In 
different degrees, and keeping in mind the paramount differences existing between rich 
European metropolises like London and extremely poor African municipalities 
considered in the study, there is a common pattern of socio-spatial segregation within 
the same urban context. Nevertheless, the particular spatial expressions assumed by the 
                                              
47 In order to compare different poverty levels across the case studies we used the proportion of the 
population living under the poverty line as the initial criterion to group the cities. In some cases we have 
used the World Bank definition of poverty line (population with a daily income of US$ 2 or less). 
Complementarily, we have taken into account other indicators for which information is available, such as 
Unmet Basic Needs (NBI for its Spanish acronym), and the Human Development Index (HDI) elaborated 
by the United Nations Development Programme, to control the initial classification. In the case of 
London exclusively he have adopted the index of “deprivation” used in the British literature, which is 
elaborated on the basis of information about health, housing, income and employment. 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page56 
processes of socio-economic inequality and polarization are worth considering owing to 
the specific challenges they pose for the development and maintenance of WSS 
networks. 
From another angle, access to WSS is one of the key components of the MDGs 
oriented at poverty eradication and human development. Inequity in the distribution of 
these services is an effective indicator of the degree of social segregation and poverty. 
In the case of water supplies, inequity can be expressed in terms of the differential 
volumes of water consumed per-capita, in the quality of the service supplied, and in the 
weight of the cost of these services in the total household income. In this regard, the 
consumption of the poorest sectors tends to be much lower than that of the richest 
population, following a pattern where the higher the income, the higher the per-capita 
consumption of water. However, the impact of the tariff on household income is many 
times higher for the poorest sectors than for the well-off, and as a trend they receive 
poor quality water.48 
Although these are well established facts, it is important to emphasise the chronic 
character of the problem and the fact that these trends which have existed for decades, 
often under public sector monopoly of WSS, are not being reversed and are rather 
exacerbated by the particular model of PSP expansion that has been implemented 
worldwide since the 1980s. Private operators need to focus their investments in ways 
that they can secure a return on capital for their shareholders, which is their main 
priority, and therefore expanding the networks to the poor has clearly not been part of 
their strategy, with few exceptions that tend to confirm the rule. They would, 
admittedly, only expand the services to the poor if this is agreed in the original contract, 
but too often they have not lived up to the letter of the original contracts, particularly in 
this precise aspect related to infrastructure expansion to cover the most deprived 
population. Even if the contract stipulates that this should be done, in the absence of 
proper regulation and public control non compliance by private providers has been the 
pattern, in most cases studied.   
For instance, in Buenos Aires and Cochabamba the expansion of the networks and 
the investment in assets renewal, maintenance, and improvement of service quality has 
been focused mainly on the areas offering the greatest profitability. The problems faced 
by the companies, whether private or public, have been mainly in the areas with low 
payment capacity.49 In both cases, the explanations for the problem of non payment 
have been the lack of a “payment culture” among the population, which often justifies 
the punitive action of disconnecting or otherwise limiting the water supply to these 
                                              
48 For example, studies carried out in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area during the 1980s and 1990s 
showed that in the poorest neighbourhoods per capita consumption may be as low as 3-4 litres per day 
during certain periods of the year such as the peaks of the rainy and dry seasons, while in middle class 
neighbourhoods the rates reach over 1000 litres per capita per day during the same periods. In addition, 
the water sold to the poor is often uncontrolled and of dubious quality, while the prices they pay are 
several times higher that in the richer areas of the city. This is a common pattern in many developing 
country cities.   
49 The municipal water company SEMAPA attained a coverage level of slightly over 50 percent by 
prioritizing a “pro-rich” connection policy and tariff system. The poor population is therefore obliged to 
buy water from informal sellers or alternative organization systems of water supply. 
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sectors, as a sort of moralising device aimed at fostering the internalisation of what is 
assumed to be an absent culture. Unfortunately, penalizing non payment with 
disconnection and similar tactics to induce a customer discipline among users such as 
reduced or intermittent flows or simultaneous disconnection of other essential services 
(e.g. electricity) has brought about significant social and political problems, not least 
because of the public health implications of such measures, in particular for the poorest 
sectors of the population.    
Summing up, the comparative analysis of the demo-geographic and socio-
economic structures and processes identified in the cities covered by the study provides 
substantive evidence for the assessment of the challenges and opportunities facing the 
introduction of PSP in the water and sanitation sector. In particular, it casts light on the 
conditions and constraints facing the expansion of WSS to the poorest sectors of the 
population, and contributes to make a more objective evaluation of the actual feasibility 
of achieving the MDGs through the expansion of the types of private sector 
participation promoted by mainstream WSS policies since the 1980s. 
The cases studied in this research involved highly heterogeneous urban centres, 
which we initially classified according to population size into three distinctive 
groupings: large metropolises, medium-sized cities, and small urban centres. However, 
our main research interests led us to explore the inter-city and intra-city heterogeneities 
in terms of their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. This was done 
through the analysis of basic socio-demographic variables such as sex and age 
distribution, population density, and living conditions, as well as socio-economic 
characteristics such as the diversity of economic structures characterizing the cities, 
their different employment patterns, unemployment, poverty, income distribution, and 
water-related health problems. 
Despite the important differences between London, Buenos Aires, and Athens, 
they share some common traits like a certain degree of demographic stabilisation, with 
a significant number of one-person households, an important presence of economically 
active population and elderly people, and a process of suburbanization of well-off 
sectors of the population in search for better living conditions. In the case of the 
medium-sized cities there is a pattern of increasing metropolization fuelled by strong 
migratory movements and by the integration of peri-urban areas. In contrast with the 
metropolitan areas, these cities tend to house a younger population and a larger 
proportion of multi-family households.  
From another angle, we also explored the intra-urban cleavages resulting from 
processes of social segregation and polarization, which in different degrees were found 
in all our case studies. The evidence shows how these different cities are influenced by 
the mainstream trends of the world economy, with an expanding services sector, a 
simultaneous decline of primary and secondary activities, and a radical re-structuration 
of the labour force. During the 1990s, contemporaneously with the rapid expansion of 
PSP in the water and sanitation sector, these trends have been expressed in high 
unemployment rates, a growth of unstable and informal employment with low wages 
and no social benefits, and worsening patterns of income distribution. The resulting 
social polarization and spatial segregation are expressed in differential patterns of 
access to WSS regarding coverage, service quality, and affordability, which represent 
crucial constraints for the implementation of the WSS programmes based on the 
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promotion of PSP. The worsening conditions of socio-economic inequality, poverty, 
deprivation, and uncontrolled urban expansion hinder the possibility of success of PSP, 
as the large multinational companies that have been at the forefront of the mainstream 
WSS policies are not interested in serving the poorest sectors of the population. 
In this connection, the limits of PSP as a vehicle for expanding WSS to the poor 
are increasingly recognized not just by donors and some IFIs like the World Bank, but 
also by the private providers themselves. One of the solutions offered has been a 
modification of the original models of PSP such as concession contracts by new 
schemes broadly termed “public-private partnerships” or “tripartite partnerships”.50 
However, the actual implementation of these models, even when they have achieved 
some degree of success, do not have the strength needed to face such a challenge as the 
one posed by the MDGs. The main weakness of these models, in addition to their 
chronic financial shortcomings, is that citizen participation continues to be largely 
neglected despite being paid lip service in the official programmes and even included in 
the text of the contracts. Unless a qualitative change takes place in the forms of citizen 
involvement in the decision making process and in the control and monitoring of WSS, 
the MDGs cannot be achieved. We consider this and other related aspects in the socio-
political and cultural dimension of the study. 
 
 
3. 1. 4. Socio-political and cultural factors 
 
Although the promotion of PSP in the water sector has been often presented as 
providing technical tools which are politically neutral, the political character of the 
policies mainstreamed since the 1980s is made apparent, for instance, by the mounting 
evidence of the direct action taken by OECD countries through their government 
departments, aid agencies, lending policies, or through the programmes designed and 
implemented by bilateral and multilateral institutions in a combination of pressure and 
persuasion to foster public sector reforms and introducing PSP. 
However, it would be misleading to explain the particular process of PSP 
expansion studied by this project by reducing it to the –undoubtedly crucial– influence 
exercised by the governments of the OECD countries and the IFIs, in particular the 
IMF, the IDB, and the World Bank. In fact, any rigorous study of this development 
must look at the interactions of these global actors with developing country 
governments and institutions as well as exploring the interdependencies between 
representatives of the global and local intelligentsias in fostering the implementation of 
these policies. The actual processes have often taken the form of a translation, when not 
merely transplantation, into developing countries of policies largely based on fairly 
simplistic assumptions about socio-economic, political and cultural processes. 
                                              
50 For example, in the Buenos Aires Suburban Area and in Niterói –among other cases–, cooperation 
programs were implemented between the company, the municipality, and the communities to expand the 
networks in poor areas. The municipality provides the materials for the extension works, the neighbors 
offer their labor, and the water companies project management and coordination. 
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The evidence gathered in our research confirms one of the project’s hypotheses 
regarding the centrality of the political dimension for the analysis and explanation of 
our research problem. Underscoring the challenges facing the policies oriented at 
expanding PSP in the water and sanitation sector there is a clash between competing 
models of governance. In this regard, it is worth recalling some of the central issues 
involved in the notion of governance,  
 
The core of governance has to do with determining what ends and values 
should be chosen and the means by which those ends and values should 
be pursued, i.e. the direction of the social unit, e.g. society, community 
or organization. Governance includes activities such as efforts to 
influence the social construction of shared beliefs about reality; the 
creation of identities and institutions [Therborn, 1991]; the allocation 
and regulation of rights and obligations among interested parties; and the 
distribution of economic means and welfare services. Governance, in 
other words, is the shaping and sustaining of the arrangements of 
authority and power within which actors make decisions and frame 
policies that are binding on individual and collective actors within 
different territorial bounds, such as those of the state, county and 
municipality (Hanf and Jansen, 1998: 3).     
 
In this connection, we examine the policies promoting PSP expansion in the 
water and sanitation sector since the 1980s looking at the particular set of ends, values, 
and principles about how WSS should be organized as well as the means that have been 
chosen to achieve these ends. We have paid particular attention to  
 
• the interrelation between the far-reaching public sector reforms implemented 
worldwide and the process of PSP expansion in the water and sanitation sector; 
• how the set of principles underscoring mainstream WSS policies have informed 
actual reforms in the field, with emphasis on the transformation of water 
resources and services from public into private goods, the promotion of 
unregulated (or poorly regulated) private water monopolies, and the attempt to 
transform the social identities of water users from right holders into customers; 
• the tensions and contradictions between formal and substantive citizenship as 
they are manifested in the implementation of mainstream WSS policies; 
• the crucial issue of value incommensurability, which is one key factor 
explaining the recurrent failure of PSP programmes in developing countries. 
 
 
The brief historical background provided in the case study reports shows the 
connections between the policies promoting the expansion of private sector 
participation in WSS and the processes of public sector reform introduced since the 
early 1980s worldwide. The case study material provides good evidence to explore the 
particular expressions that these global trends have taken in the different countries and 
regions. One particular feature that is worth highlighting are the diverging trends of 
centralization and decentralization observed in the different countries studied. A note of 
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caution has to be included here, as we are describing formal processes and are not 
assuming that these policies have actually decentralized power in a meaningful way (for 
instance, by sustainably empowering provincial and local authorities and communities). 
In fact, the evidence suggests that this has not been the case in most of the examples 
studied, in particular in developing countries. 
With few exceptions, local authorities have not been strengthened by the 
decentralization policies and more often than not they have been actually weakened 
because they have seen their duties and responsibilities greatly increased without a 
corresponding enhancement neither of their political and financial autonomy or 
administrative and technical capacities. As shown later, this has been reflected, among 
other issues, in the pattern of poor performance affecting local and provincial 
authorities in the regulation and monitoring of private concessions in the WSS sector. In 
some cases, in what seems to be a paradox, decentralization has been actually twined 
with a degree of centralization in crucial policy decisions, as illustrated by the case of 
Argentina during the 1990s where the federal executive was able to foster PSP reforms 
virtually unchecked owing to the absence of any counterbalancing forces. An important 
counter development, however, was observed in Wales, where the process of 
“devolution” of a limited degree of autonomy from the UK executive in London to the 
provincial level led to the creation of the National Assembly for Wales in July 1999. 
One the first decisions approved by the Assembly was the de-privatization of the Welsh 
water utility in 2001 and its transformation into a not-for-profit entity, which became 
the first clear departure from the system of full-divestiture established in England and 
Wales in 1989. 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the mentioned counter movements, the countries 
studied can be broadly clustered as following two different trends: a first group formed 
by England and Wales and –to a lesser extent– Greece (this may apply mainly to 
Athens) that experienced different degrees of centralization and even weakening of the 
role of local authorities since the mid 1970s. Tanzania also experienced a process of 
centralization and delocalisation between 1972 and 1982 –although paradoxically these 
policies were implemented under the label of “decentralization”–, but the country gave 
a U turn in 1982 and has followed a pattern closer to the second group of developing 
countries studied, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Kenya, and Mexico, which underwent 
processes of decentralization of WSS from the federal to the provincial and municipal 
levels (see Appendix A2, Table A3). Finland is a special case from the perspective of 
these policies, as the country has a long-standing tradition of decentralized WSS 
policies, which have been in the hands of municipal bodies and cooperatives since the 
late nineteenth century. 
Regarding the first group, in England and Wales there has been a consistent 
trend towards further centralization of WSS since World War II, which neared 
completion in the far-reaching reforms introduced in 1973-74 when over 1000 
municipal and small scale WSS were amalgamated in ten basin-wide Regional Water 
Authorities (RWAs). The role of local authorities in overseeing these services was 
further curtailed by new reforms implemented in 1983, and by the time when the ten 
RWAs were privatised in 1989, the WSS systems had undergone an unprecedented 
process of delocalisation, regionalization and centralization in the country. It should be 
noticed here that although the devolution of limited legislative autonomy to Wales in 
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1999 is an important counter development, especially because it led to the de-
privatization of the Welsh water utility in 2001, it has not been part of a wider process 
of decentralization of public decision making. In Greece, the WSS utility of Athens that 
had been in private hands since 1928 until the mid 1970s was placed in the federal 
domain in 1980 under the form of a “corporatized utility” directly dependent from the 
government, though in the rest of the country WSS remained in municipal hands. 
Apart from these two cases, the rest has followed a general trend of 
decentralization of WSS that can be traced back at least to 1980 with the break up in 
Argentina of the National Water and Sanitation Works (OSN) carried out by the 
military dictatorship that ruled the country at that time (1976-1983). Decentralization 
policies were also introduced in Tanzania (1982), Mexico (1983), Bolivia (1985-89), 
Kenya (1986), and Brazil (1988), although there has been a high variance among these 
countries’ experiences regarding the actual pace and scope of implementation as well as 
in the concrete forms adopted by the policies in the field. Thus, Argentina has been the 
only case where decentralization was effectively followed by a large-scale programme 
of PSP expansion implemented since 1989 in the whole country, with small though 
significant exceptions. Between 1991, when the first privatization of WSS took place in 
the province of Corrientes, and 1999 the proportion of the country’s population that had 
its WSS provided by private companies rose from 0 to 70 percent. However, even in 
this case there were some important counter forces at work, as illustrated by the 
province of Chaco where a public consultation held in 1994 to reform the provincial 
constitution with the aim of promoting PSP resulted in the massive opposition of the 
electorate to the policy. As a result, PSP became banned by the provincial constitution, 
a decision that cost the province dearly as it was excluded from the National 
Programme for Potable Water and Sewerage (PRONAPAC) funded by the Inter 
American Development Bank (IDB): access to PRONAPAC’s funding was conditional 
on opening the WSS sector to private sector participation. 
In all other cases the transition from decentralization to PSP expansion in WSS 
has been much slower and restricted in scope. Perhaps the best example is Brazil, where 
the process of decentralization prompted by the 1988 constitutional reform was not 
translated into an expansion of private sector participation in the WSS, despite the 
“enabling environment” created by legal and administrative reforms introduced since 
the early 1990s with the backing of –and through the conditionalities imposed by– the 
IFIs. Thus, after over one decade of pro-PSP reforms in the water sector only 5 percent 
of the urban population of Brazil was served by private operators in 2004. From a total 
of around 5700 municipalities only 33 have granted their WSS in concession to private 
operators, while only 2 of the 33 state capitals and none of the state WSS utilities have 
adopted the model of PSP promoted by the mainstream policies. 
The Brazilian experience regarding the interrelation between decentralization 
and PSP expansion merits further examination given that the 1988 constitutional reform 
elicited an increasing autonomy of municipal power vis a vis the traditionally powerful 
provincial governments, which is of the highest relevance to understand the processes at 
work in the WSS sector. In this connection, decentralization has produced contradictory 
results. On the hand, as shown later, in the cases chosen for this research –all of them 
municipalities– the introduction of PSP was made possible thanks to increased 
municipal autonomy that gave mayors stronger decision powers in a context of rapid 
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institutional change in WSS. The 1995 Concessions Law, which was part of a full 
package of pro-PSP reforms mostly funded by the IDB and the World Bank, was timely 
approved in congress at a time when most municipal WSS concessions granted in the 
1970s to the state water utilities were coming to an end. This was perceived as a very 
fertile ground for PSP, especially because there is a widespread inconformity with the 
state concessionaries among the municipalities. 
On the other hand, however, a large number of municipalities in Brazil have 
been engaged in a long-term struggle for the democratisation of WSS since the 1970s, 
and they perceived the policies of PSP expansion as a new threat that had to be 
confronted. These municipalities, organized through the National Association of 
Municipal Water and Sanitation Services (ASSEMAE),51 continue to challenge the 
authoritarian model of the state water utilities but have also become strong opponents of 
the pro-PSP initiatives introduced in the country since 1990. Their active political role, 
fostered by the decentralization process, and in alliance with NGOs, unions, important 
sectors of the Catholic Church, and community organizations, among other actors, is 
one of the key factors explaining the slow and very limited progress of PSP expansion 
in Brazil. 
Nevertheless, to achieve a better understanding of the process we tried to go 
beyond the institutional and formal confrontations around decentralization and PSP 
expansion to examine the underlying principles and assumptions that underscore these 
reforms, which we discuss next. 
 
 
3. 1. 4. 1. The principles underscoring pro-PSP water policies52  
 
The reforms implemented since the 1980s in the WSS sector were largely predicated on 
the set of principles53 associated with the “neoliberal” model that has inspired 
mainstream water policy worldwide during the last two decades. Although there is a 
need to differentiate between several strands of economic rationalism that range from 
extreme neoliberal calls for unregulated free-market water policies to the moderate 
introduction of economic principles for enhancing the management and administration 
of water resources and WSS, mainstream water policies implemented since the 1980s 
have been mostly framed in neoliberal terms. 
 
                                              
51 A large number of municipalities (today over 50 percent of the country’s total) engaged in a struggle 
for the democratisation of the WSS sector since the 1970s, when most systems were given in concession 
to the state water utilities under strong pressures from the military dictatorship that ruled the country at 
the time. These municipalities created the National Association of Municipal Water and Sanitation 
Services (ASSEMAE - http://www.assemae.org.br/), which has become a major actor in the field.   
52 This section is mainly based on Castro (2004b). 
53 It is important to keep in mind that we are here discussing formal policy principles and we do not 
assume that there is a perfect correspondence between these principles and the actual processes taking 
place in the ground. This is valid both for the discussion on neoliberal water policy principles as well as 
for the principles of administrative and economic rationalism (e.g. we do not assume that the state is 
intrinsically a defender of the “public interest” as understood in the administrative rationalist framework). 
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       Box 4. Key principles of neoliberal water policy  
a) Water resources should be allocated through the market; that is, private water rights 
should be created replacing any existing forms of collective or public rights and they 
should be freely tradable; 
b) Water services have to be considered an economic good, in the sense of being a 
private good that has to be bought in the market; by definition, once WSS are 
considered to be private goods, non payers can be excluded from accessing them; the 
notion that WSS are a public or social good must be abandoned; 
c) Water services should be provided by private operators, which are inherently more 
efficient than public ones; if possible, water services should be self regulated by 
market mechanisms and state intervention should be minimized if not altogether 
cancelled; 
d) Water services are not a natural monopoly, as claimed by the defenders of state 
intervention; most operations can actually be opened to competition, perhaps with the 
exception of some core activities; however, high transaction costs can make 
competition difficult; in these cases, a privately-owned water monopoly is preferable 
to a public one; even then, keep regulation to a minimum or cancel it altogether if 
possible; 
e) Water users should be transformed into consumers, and right holders into 
customers. 
Source: Castro (2006), chapter 6. 
 
 
However, the implementation of these policies has not taken place in the 
historical vacuum, a fact that the actors promoting these reforms have slowly come to 
find out. In particular, from the perspective of this section, in most countries formal 
WSS continue to be organized along the principles of what has been termed 
“administrative rationalism”, a public sector tradition that has been responsible for 
effectively developing the water sector worldwide and –at least in developed countries– 
for the universalization of WSS since the mid twentieth century. The resilience of the 
administrative rationalist tradition, together with other factors considered in 
forthcoming sections, is likely to be an important explanatory element for the slow 
progress of PSP in the water sector. 
Let us go back to mainstream water policy as implemented since the 1980s. 
Although the core set of principles characterizing these policies can be distilled from 
the theoretical and political literature, they are not equally shared by all actors 
promoting pro-PSP policies, at least not to the full extent of their meaning and practical 
implications, and even within the institutions that have been at the forefront of PSP 
expansion like the World Bank it is possible to find significant disagreements among 
their water sector experts regarding water policy. A good example was provided by 
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Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist at the World Bank, in his evaluation of the role 
played by the IFIs in developing countries: 
 
In setting the rules of the game, commercial and financial interests and 
mind-sets have seemingly prevailed within the international economic 
institutions. A particular view of the role of government and markets has 
come to prevail –a view which is not universally accepted within the 
developed countries, but which is being forced upon the developing 
countries and the economies in transition (Stiglitz, 2002: 224-5).  
 
 
This is a significant statement because it emphasises that despite the intricacies 
and internal contradictions characterizing the system of global financial governance, it 
is possible to discern the regularities and trajectories characterizing the changing 
balance between the socio-economic and political forces at work. This lends support to 
our argument that although the principles have not been mechanically translated into 
practice, they constitute the fundamental elements that structure much of the actual 
policies implemented in the water sector worldwide since the 1980s, and our case 
studies provide substantial evidence to this effect. This, though, does not mean that 
these principles have been effectively or coherently applied. In fact, the actual 
deployment of these policies has often exposed the fallacious and mutually 
contradictory character of some of the principles such as, for instance, the claim that 
PSP would enhance competitiveness. The evidence from our study, which is consistent 
with the findings emerging from other research efforts, shows that there is no 
competition between providers, that competition for the market is severely restricted to 
a small number of large multinational companies, and that the vertical integration of the 
utilities (as a trend, not subject to regulation) encourages monopolistic behavior.54 
Nevertheless, our main focus here is on the confrontation between alternative principles 
informing water policy, among which the transformation of water from public or social 
into private good has paramount importance. 
In most cases studied, the implementation of the principle that water should be 
treated as a private good has been limited to the provision of WSS, with the exception 
of Cochabamba, where water resources were also included in the concession. In 
general, implementing this principle required important changes to the legal framework 
and even to the national constitution in some cases (see Appendix A2, Table A3), 
changes that were heavily influenced by conditionalities imposed on developing 
countries as a requirement for the reception of aid or loans. As a general trend, in all 
cases studied the legal framework for granting concessions of WSS to private 
companies included the right of disconnection for non payment, which is the logical 
consequence of transforming the status of WSS from public to private good (i.e. in 
economic theory private goods are those that non-payers can be excluded from 
                                              
54 For a more specific account on competitiveness see the Cross-comparative report on the economic 
financial dimension (D20, Azpiazu and Schorr, 2004) and the individual case study reports (see 
Reference List). 
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consuming).55 It is worth keeping in mind the differentiation between the introduction 
of economic rationalist principles like proper pricing of public services to ensure their 
economic and financial sustainability, and the transformation of WSS into for-profit 
private activities, most commonly referred to as “commodification”.56 Although these 
processes can be closely knitted in practice to the point that their differentiation might 
be difficult, there is an important distance both in principle and also in relation to the 
consequences. While always difficult to justify, rising prices for WSS when users 
perceive that there is a fair and more or less transparent system at work –for example, if 
they are part of the decision making process, are somehow represented in it, or at least 
are protected from extreme abuse in some way– is far more feasible and sustainable 
than doing it when the general perception is that narrow private interests are benefiting 
from what is broadly considered to be an essential public service. 
This is not just a matter of perception or preference, and the cases studied 
provide significant evidence about the problems arising from the commodification of 
WSS through the expansion of private sector participation. In particular, the 
introduction of PSP has been followed by steep price increases and a systematic trend to 
favour short-term shareholder interest over users’ satisfaction and contractual 
investment commitments. In most developing country cases observed, user 
dissatisfaction was recurrent and non payment of water bills is often one of the chosen 
tactics to express it. In cases like England and Wales, where user disobedience has not 
been as openly explicit as in the Latin American examples, it should not be discarded 
that current levels of non payment (affecting 20 percent of the households) be the 
partial result of a silent revolt against the commodification of WSS. Although the 
controversy around the causes for non payment continues, the evidence strongly 
suggests that there is a poor association between expanding PSP and enhancing the 
willingness to pay on the part of WSS users.57 In fact, there is substantial evidence of 
the impact of rising water tariffs on the poorer sectors of the population in England and 
                                              
55 It is important to note that disconnection policies are also applied by public operators. In those cases, 
however, disconnection seems to be practiced with a higher degree of political legitimacy perhaps 
because users are receiving a public service, not purchasing a privately owned commodity (e.g. 
EMASESA, the municipal WSS utility of Seville in Spain, routinely practices disconnection apparently 
with a high degree of legitimacy [EMASESA, 2000]). In some other cases that have been brought to our 
attention, disconnection is practiced by public operators that differentiate between likely free-riders 
mostly from high and middle income sectors and vulnerable users such as low-income families (e.g. the 
case of DMAE, the municipal WSS utility of Porto Alegre, Brazil). 
56 In relation to water, and environmental goods and services generally, commodification can be defined 
as the process by which relations between human beings and the natural environment become 
increasingly transformed into market transactions and the elements of nature converted into tradable 
commodities for private profit. 
57 In fact, there is substantial evidence of the impact of rising water tariffs on the poorer sectors of the 
population in England and Wales since privatization (Herbert and Kempson, 1995; Ward, 1997: chapter1; 
Bakker, 2001; Drakeford, 2002). On the most recent wave of non payment problems, see Fitch and 
Howard, 2002; United Kingdom Parliament, 2003; also, the National Consumer Council’s web page on 
affordability problems in the privatised UK WSS sector: 
http://www.ncc.org.uk/fuelandwater/index.htm#water [consulted in August 2004; no longer available]. 
See also OFWAT (2004), pp. 14-19. 
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Wales since privatization (Herbert and Kempson, 1995; Ward, 1997: chapter1; Bakker, 
2001; Drakeford, 2002).  Nevertheless, affordability problems are certainly part of the 
explanation of the unwillingness to pay showed by users in the developing countries 
involved in the study where a large share of the population lives in extreme poverty, 
such as Bolivia or Kenya, but also in the poorest neighbourhoods and slums of the 
urban areas of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In this connection, as showed by the 
analysis of the economic impact of PSP-related tariff increases, the poorer sectors of the 
population are the worst affected58 which is consistent with the findings of ongoing 
research59 on the topic and refutes claims that the expansion of PSP in water and 
sanitation is helping the disadvantaged. 
This discussion brings us closer to the consideration of another principle of 
mainstream WSS policy: the claim that self-regulating private monopolies are the best 
instruments to extend WSS to the poor in developing countries, which we briefly 
discussed earlier. Although admittedly this is an extreme position, the principle that 
WSS services should be provided by unregulated private monopolies is one of the 
tenets that we have identified in the specialized literature promoting PSP in the water 
sector. These authors have gone well beyond the argument that the private sector is 
inherently superior to the public to claim that private water monopolies would achieve 
the most beneficial results for the poor in developing countries if left unregulated.60 In 
our interviews with water experts in different countries, including private sector 
representatives, the fact that this argument in favour of unregulated private water 
monopolies has been put forward by top officers of the IFIs promoting PSP worldwide 
caused all sort of reactions ranging from disbelief to dismissal. And yet, the evidence 
from the case studies shows precisely that the concession contracts have mostly been 
launched in the absence of any regulatory framework and institutions or in conditions 
where the capacity of regulatory bodies to exercise control and enforce regulation has 
been weak or non existent. This suggests that the principle that WSS should be 
provided by unregulated private monopolies has –in one way or another– influenced 
actual policies in the field, a hypothesis which may be worth exploring further in future 
research efforts. 
 
Summing up, the main trends observed in relation to the regulatory frameworks 
in the cases studied show that: 
 
• the PSP concessions have often been created before a proper regulatory 
framework (or even legislation) was set in place; in some cases, the 
creation of the regulator was just a formal procedure to comply with the 
requirements of the IFIs related to financial support for public sector 
                                              
58 See Azpiazu and Schorr (2004). Also see the case study reports, in particular documents Azpiazu et. al. 
(2003), Nyangeri (2003), and Torregrosa et. al. (2003). 
59 See, for instance, the special issue of Geoforum on “Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” 
(Laurie, 2007). 
60 Brook Cowen and Cowen (1998); See also Newbery (1999: 385-6) for an argument in favour of the 
superiority of self-regulation by market forces over regulation in the case of networked utilities. 
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reforms but the actual commitment by governments with setting efficient 
and autonomous regulatory bodies has been very low, with few 
exceptions; 
• in most developing country cases studied the regulatory frameworks set 
in place are structurally weak owing to lack of financial resources or 
poor administrative or technical capacity; in most cases, regulation in 
practice has been ineffective, especially regarding the crucial issue of 
ensuring compliance with contract commitments by private operators; 
• also, in most cases the degree of autonomy of the regulator vis a vis 
political authorities and private operators is very low; even in cases like 
England and Wales, where there is a strong regulatory system in place, 
political interference has been a strategically important driver of crucial 
regulatory decisions affecting such issues as setting tariff levels or 
banning disconnection for non payment; 
• the development of regulatory structures that accompanies the expansion 
of PSP has gone counter one of the main arguments put forward to 
promote PSP in the first place: that PSP would allow the reduction of 
public sector bureaucracy. The evidence shows that there is an expansion 
of bureaucratic structures (the case of England and Wales is perhaps the 
best example), which is reflected in higher costs for the users (regulatory 
fees become an additional component of the tariff structure);   
• as a pattern, improvements to the regulatory framework and 
enhancement of the regulator’s role have taken place belatedly, some 
times after several years (e.g. Buenos Aires in Argentina and Limeira in 
Brazil), and have been the result of mounting social and political 
pressures to establish stricter control over private operators; even then, 
when regulators seek to assert their autonomy and exercise their 
monitoring powers, their decisions have been often overruled by the 
political authorities (the case of ETOSS in Argentina being a 
paradigmatic example). 
 
 
Although in the cases studied there is formally a regulatory system of some 
description in place, the evidence shows that regulation is one of the weakest aspects of 
the WSS policies implemented after the mainstream pro-PSP model since the 1980s. 
For this reason, it seems sensible to reflect on the possibility that strict and truly 
autonomous regulation may have not been a priority for those actors promoting PSP in 
the water sector, a hypothesis that receives some support from the analysis of the 
arguments in favour of minimal regulation or self-regulation exposed by authors 
sympathetic with the mainstream model. 
On another count, it is clear that the transformations of users into consumers and 
right holders into customers have been in progress much before the mainstream WSS 
policies examined in this project were conceived and implemented, as they are part of 
the more general process of commodification that increasingly transforms human 
relationships in all spheres of activity, including the governance, management and 
social distribution of water and WSS. It is also clear that one of the most negative 
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aspects of this long-term process of commodification has been its effect on the poorer 
sectors of the population, who continue to pay much higher prices for normally 
substandard and often unregulated WSS. However, it is well established that the 
commodification process has been much slower in the water sector –especially in 
networked WSS– than in other basic public services like energy, telecommunications, 
health, education, and transport where PSP has progressed at a faster pace. 
In this regard, one of the explicit objectives of mainstream WSS policies has 
been to accelerate the transition from public service to private good, and the main 
efforts have been focused on transforming the identity of the service provider through 
the process of public sector reform and PSP expansion. Our hypothesis is that another 
important transition required by the model, that of right holder and user into consumer 
and customer has received much less attention, perhaps because it was assumed that this 
would be a sort of mechanical transition that would follow once the PSP-based system 
of provision was in place. We have gathered enough evidence to consider this 
hypothesis as plausible, and the overall trend suggests that pro-PSP reformers have 
been largely oblivious to the potential response that these policies would elicit among 
the population. 
One particular example of this is the fact that “user participation”, that is, the 
involvement of users in the process of transition did not rank very high in the 
mainstream WSS model until very late (late 1990s), when the recurrent failures of PSP 
experiences –often related to user dissatisfaction and opposition– demanded an urgent 
review of the model. However, as described earlier the evidence emerging from the 
cases demonstrates that users and right holders have responded with a wide array of 
actions including the rejection through democratic vote of the policy that would 
transform WSS from right to commodity (Chaco in Argentina; Porto Alegre and Recife, 
in Brazil), presenting administrative complaints to the authorities (Aguascalientes, 
Mexico), civil disobedience (non payment of water bills as a political statement; 
Tucumán, Argentina), massive mobilisation (Tucumán, Argentina; Cochabamba, 
Bolivia), and exercising direct violence against the property of WSS operators 
(clandestine water tapping, destruction of water meters, occupation of buildings, etc; 
Mexico, Kenya, Brazil, Bolivia) or their employees (e.g. kidnapping of staff; Mexico), 
among others. In our perspective, the very limited user involvement in the governance 
of water resources and WSS observed in the case studies, as well as the conflicts 
emerging from the resulting widespread perception of exclusion, reflect the underlying 
tensions between formal and substantive citizenship. 
 
 
3. 1. 4. 2. Between formal and substantive citizenship 
 
In most cases examined, pro- PSP policies have in one way or another incorporated an 
explicit reference to the crucial importance of citizen involvement and participation for 
the success of the reform process. Unfortunately, in most cases too this has been simply 
a rhetorical device and meaningful citizen involvement, even in their role as individual 
customers, has been largely neglected in the process. However, in addition to the 
tension between formal and substantive citizenship, namely between the formal 
acknowledgement of the rights and their actual exercise, there is also a confrontation 
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between different traditions of citizenship underlying mainstream water policy, which 
we examine elsewhere. For instance, in the liberal Anglo Saxon tradition citizenship is 
mostly restricted to the exercise of civil and political rights, while “social rights” are not 
considered to be a component of citizenship. In the extreme, for liberal thinkers social 
rights constitute an obstacle for the achievement of citizenship, which underscores their 
opposition to redistributive policies, state intervention or regulation of private activities. 
The recognition of social rights of citizenship is rather associated with, broadly 
speaking, socialist and communitarian traditions, which informed the social democratic 
ideals leading to the universalization of essential services such as health, education and 
WSS in the post Second World War period. An additional layer of contradiction is 
added when policies developed in the context of Western political cultures are 
transplanted and transposed to developing countries, where they are adopted and 
adapted at best, or imposed with complete disregard for local conditions at worst. Let us 
examine these contradictions in the light of the evidence provided by the case studies. 
In formal terms enhancing citizenship has been an important rhetorical element 
in the process of public sector reform implemented in developing countries through the 
policies of decentralization and expansion of PSP. For instance, in Mexico sweeping 
reforms were introduced in 1992 in the water sector seeking to replace traditional 
clientelistic practices by a “new water culture” based on citizen involvement, 
community responsibility, and private sector delivery of services that had been 
previously a state responsibility. In Bolivia a Popular Participation Law was passed in 
1994, seeking to promote more citizen involvement in local government affairs, and the 
creation of an inter-sector regulatory framework during the 1993-97 reforms allowed 
for citizen participation in the regulatory process. In the European Union, the European 
Water Framework Directive passed in the year 2000, which is being transposed into 
each country’s national legislation, declares that “the success of this Directive relies on 
close cooperation and coherent action at Community, Member State and local level as 
well as on information, consultation and involvement of the public, including users” . It 
would not be difficult to extend the number of examples of this formal 
acknowledgement of the crucial importance of involving people in their roles of citizens 
and water users in order to achieve the expected results from the policies being 
implemented. Nevertheless, there is overwhelming evidence that in practice citizen 
involvement, even when people’s roles are limited to that of customers, has been highly 
restricted in most cases, and particularly so in processes involving PSP in the water and 
sanitation sector. Let us consider a selection of examples. 
For instance, the case of Cochabamba is the only one among our case studies 
where the rights over water resources were at stake, when the new water law passed in 
1999 and the concession granted to a private consortium in the same year threatened to 
expropriate the existing water rights of the indigenous farmers of the Cochabamba 
Valley. In fact, indigenous water rights, based on what is locally known as “uses and 
customs”, were neglected in the relevant policy reforms carried out in Bolivia during 
the 1990s such as the Basic Sanitation Plan (1992-2000). Moreover, by transferring all 
water rights to the private company, including those abstraction rights previously in the 
hands of Cochabamba’s municipal operator SEMAPA, the expropriation would have 
also been extended to the whole community, which owns the water rights through the 
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municipal body. This was one of the key reasons for the mass mobilization that led to 
the contract cancellation in March 2000. 
In Argentina, most concessions to private companies made during the 1990s 
were carried out by-passing the congress (through the issue of special presidential 
“Decrees of Necessity and Urgency”) and avoiding public consultation or citizen 
involvement, as it happened in 1993 with the case of Aguas Argentinas in Buenos 
Aires. Moreover, the concessions were granted in the absence of any antimonopoly 
legislation, specific regulatory bodies or consumer representation. In the case of Buenos 
Aires, successive renegotiations of the original concession contract followed the same 
model favouring the private company’s interests over the public. In the extreme, even 
the regulator ETOSS was excluded from crucial negotiations in 1997 when the body 
tried to exercise some degree of control given the overt lack of compliance by the 
private company with its contractual obligations in relation to investment commitments. 
Another crucial aspect affecting citizen participation in Buenos Aires is the 
monopolization of the production, access, and use of vital information about the 
running of the water utility by the private operator, which results in both the regulators 
and the users’ organisations being dependent on the information released by the 
company, which leaves little room for independent assessment and monitoring. The role 
of users’ organizations was only defined after the concession was granted and it was 
limited to presenting complaints, whether legal or administrative. After a review of the 
role of users in the face of mounting citizen unrest in the later 1990s, user involvement 
has been mainly limited to their engagement as providers of labour and materials for the 
expansion of the network in poor neighbourhoods, a programme that has been jointly 
developed by the company and international and local NGOs. Although these forms of 
“civil society” engagement were obviously a step forward from the alienation that users 
suffered in the original concession, they still have little say on the crucial aspects that 
constitute the governance of the water system, specially regarding decisions about who 
governs the system, how, at what cost, and for whom. 
In the case of Tucumán, the overall process leading to the concession of the 
public utility in 1995 was marred from the start by lack of transparency and widespread 
suspicion of corruption of public officers and politicians. The negotiations were carried 
out in the absence of public debate or even consultation, and citizens were also 
excluded from the activities of control and regulation foreseen in the regulatory 
framework and the licensing contract. However, in sharp contrast with the case of 
Buenos Aires, the authoritarian character of the process in the end resulted in the early 
collapse of the concession. The increase of 106 percent applied to the water bills shortly 
after the private operator took control of the service provoked widespread unrest among 
water users and prompted the organization of a wide-ranging front of opposition to the 
privatization through a “refusal to pay” campaign that included municipal authorities, 
provincial legislators, and workers who had been laid off by the private company. 
In addition, problems with the quality of water being delivered and the extreme 
high temperatures of the summer of 1995-96 compounded the situation and the protest 
movement grew rapidly to the point that 86 percent of the users, including the business 
union Economic Federation of Tucuman and the provincial government joined in the 
civil disobedience by refusing to pay their water bills. One of the most symbolic 
protests was the “Bottle demonstration” carried out by the users against the private 
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company and the provincial authorities, which included piles of bottles placed in front 
of the government headquarters and a mock “legislative session” held in the central 
square representing scenes of the briberization —to borrow from Joseph Stiglitz 
(Stiglitz, 2002: 58)— that allegedly took place when the privatization law was passed. 
In the end, the private company took the case to the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and sued the Argentinean government for a 
compensation of US$ 300 million under the provisions of the Reciprocal Treaty of 
Investment Protection between Argentina and France. The company lost the case before 
the ICSID in the first instance, but it appealed and the negotiations continue in what has 
become a landmark case in international disputes involving PSP. In September 1997, 
the company and the provincial government terminated the contract and the services 
were resumed by the public sector. 
In Bolivia, the institutional framework for user participation has been limited to 
creating formal channels for the presentation of complaints and appeals about services’ 
deficiencies and grievances. There is also a provision by which the regulator has the 
power to call public audiences for consulting users on particular issues. In general, 
these instruments have not helped to promote meaningful citizen involvement, as 
showed by the fact that a public audience held in Cochabamba in December 1999 to 
consult the users over the tariff increases to be implemented by the private 
concessionaire attracted only 14 participants. The evidence shows that, although the 
regulator was supposed to act in defence of users’ interests, the prevailing perception 
among the population was that the interest of the private water operator was receiving 
priority over those of the community. These feelings were further accentuated because 
the municipality was also left outside the discussion over the tariff increases, effectively 
curtailing the only other mechanism available to citizens for exercising control over the 
process. Moreover, people had been alienated from the start, as the process leading to 
the granting of the concession had been conducted with complete disregard for citizens’ 
preferences and opinions, in conditions of secrecy whereby essential information such 
as the contractual obligations and the financial plans of the private operator were hidden 
from public scrutiny through a confidentiality clause included in the contract. 
In the three case studies carried out in Brazil, Limeira, Niterói, and the Lakes 
Region, the pattern has been very similar: the processes leading to the granting of the 
concessions were marred by political controversy, allegations of corruption, and long 
litigations in the judicial system. Against this background, it is possible to perhaps 
understand why the Director of the World Bank’s Brazilian office, Vinod Thomas, 
declared in late 2003 that “when there is risk that privatization might create a 
monopoly, it is better to leave the services in State hands. [… he referred] to the case of 
Russia, a country that in the last few years has had one of the worst performances in 
social terms, as an example of privatization processes that should have never happened” 
(Folha de Sao Paulo, Brazil, 21 September 2003: B3.). He may have probably been 
reflecting on the similar problems that were already affecting the process of PSP 
expansion in Brazil. Let us see some of the examples from our case studies. 
In Limeira, for instance, the changes needed in the municipal law to allow the 
concession of the WSS to a private operator were implemented with disregard for the 
relevant legal procedures and by allegedly bribing opposition MPs to vote in favour of 
the reform in exchange for jobs and other benefits. An inquiry over the alleged 
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irregularities that was launched under pressure from the media and from mounting 
public protests was shelved and the results were not divulged. However, the provincial 
Public Prosecution Office intervened and unearthed additional irregularities, in 
particular the fact that the concession contract had been ratified on the same date that 
the winning bidder had been announced, without making public neither the proposals of 
the other competitors nor the criteria used to select the winner. The evidence gathered 
by the Prosecutor also fuelled further allegations of bribery, which would have taken 
place to buy the vote in favour of the winning bidder. In January 2000 a judge declared 
the concession cancelled, but the private operator appealed the decision and won the 
case in the Supreme Court of Justice. Citizen involvement has been almost non existent 
in this case, which is also characterized by a very poor regulatory framework, and the 
overall process was largely hidden from public scrutiny. An important outcome of the 
Limeira conflict, however, is that the high profile of the political and legal struggles, 
which were amplified by the media, had the effect of delaying or cancelling similar 
projects involving the introduction of PSP in water and sanitation services in other 
municipalities of the state of Sao Paulo. 
The other cases examined present similar characteristics in important respects, 
being subject to fierce political and legal battles, lack of transparency in the bidding 
processes, and allegations of corruption. A crucial aspect shared in common by these 
cases is the secrecy involving the contracts, especially the lack of information about 
such issues as the authorized rates of return on investment or the details of the 
committed investment and financial plans, which renders regulatory monitoring and 
public scrutiny unfeasible.  
More examples from England and Wales, Greece, Kenya, and Mexico can be 
consulted in the relevant case studies and in the comparative report. However, there 
have been important examples of what may happen when citizens are meaningfully 
involved in the decision making process or local authorities have some degree of 
autonomy to decide between alternative possibilities, free from the threat of loan 
conditionalities or the imposition of policies by the federal government. For instance, in 
a number of cases citizens from several Latin American regions have managed to 
exercise a higher degree of control over the water policies being implemented in their 
area than, for instance, their counterparts in the European examples examined here. In 
this regard, when the decision to privatize the water utilities in England Wales was 
taken in the late 1980s, opinion polls suggested that over three quarters of the 
population opposed the move, but the decision was taken nevertheless with complete 
disregard for citizens’ preferences and without consultation. As already discussed, this 
pattern has been repeated in most cases studied here, whereby PSP projects have been 
implemented without citizen involvement or despite open citizen opposition to the 
policies. However, during our research we have identified a number of situations where 
citizens were given, whether intentionally or not, an opportunity to express their 
opinion and exercise a minimum degree of control over the process. 
One such instance took place in the province of Chaco, in Argentina, when in 
1994 the provincial government called a public consultation on the acceptability of 
introducing PSP in the running of public services, WSS included. The result of the 
consultation, which was legally binding, took the political establishment by surprise 
(the most important political parties supported, or at least did not challenge, the federal 
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government’s far-reaching privatization programme of the time) as the voters massively 
rejected the PSP option and decided to keep public services in public hands. This 
decision was inscribed in the provincial constitution, which as a result forbade the 
introduction of PSP in its territory. Unfortunately for Chaco, the democratic decision 
taken by the citizens was punished by the federal government, which excluded the 
province from the national funding scheme for WSS infrastructure, partially funded by 
the Inter American Development Bank, as participation in the scheme was conditional 
on privatizing the water utilities.61 
Other examples of what may happen when citizens have the opportunity to 
voice their opinions are provided by the participatory processes implemented in several 
Brazilian cities, such as Porto Alegre, in the South-eastern state of Rio Grande do Sul, 
and Recife, the capital of the state of Pernambuco in the Northeast of the country. The 
case of Porto Alegre is much better known (World Bank, 2003: 42; Viero, 2003), and 
therefore we will only refer here to the case of Recife. Since 1995 Pernambuco’s Water 
and Sanitation Company (COMPESA) became a target for the PSP programme fostered 
by the federal government, and by 1999/2000 the preparations for launching a bid were 
already well advanced with the agreement of the federal, state, and municipal 
governments and with support from the World Bank through the Modernization 
Programme for Water and Sanitation Services (PMSS). In addition, a loan being 
negotiated with the World Bank for investment in basic infrastructure in the Recife 
Metropolitan Area was also tied up to the condition that the COMPESA were 
privatized. However, the unexpected electoral success of the Workers’ Party (PT) in 
Recife and other important municipalities of the metropolis changed the dynamic of the 
process, as the PT won the election with a programme that opposed the privatization of 
public services. In 2002, the municipal government of the capital organized Recife’s 
First Municipal Conference on Water and Sanitation, opening the debate about the 
future of public services in the city –together with other crucial topics– in a highly 
participatory process which led to a massive vote in favour of keeping public services, 
including WSS, in public hands (Rocha Ferreira, 2003). Faced with the outcome of the 
Conference, and with the determination of the municipal authorities to keep their 
campaign promises, the state governor accepted to freeze the bidding process. 
Nevertheless, further pressure was put on the municipal government to accept the 
introduction of PSP in the state utility COMPESA through the conditionalities included 
in the loan negotiated with the World Bank for the recuperation of degraded areas of the 
metropolis. It was only after very difficult negotiations carried out in Brazil and 
Washington, and after the intervention of the federal government of Brazil, that the 
bank’s negotiators accepted to withdraw the conditionality of PSP from the loan 
contract as requested by Recife’s municipal authorities.62 
                                              
61 Roze (2003). 
62 Interview with Eng. Antônio da Costa Miranda Neto, Secretary of Sanitation of the Municipality of 
Recife and International Representative of the Brazilian Association of Municipal Water and Sanitation 
Utilities (ASSEMAE), Recife, 12 December 2003. We have omitted the details of the negotiations for 
reasons of space, but the interview provided good evidence of the strength with which IFIs use loan 
conditionalities to foster PSP policies in developing countries. The final negotiations for this project, 
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These are very relevant examples of what may happen when people are given a 
meaningful opportunity to participate and express their preferences and this is 
combined with a minimum degree of autonomy for the local authorities and regional 
governments. Unfortunately, as already observed this has been seldom the case in the 
mainstream policies promoting PSP in the water sector. It can be argued that although 
rhetorically social participation has been recognized as a crucial factor in ensuring the 
success of WSS policy reforms (European Commission, 2002, 2003; GWP, 2002, 2003; 
UNDP, 2003), the prevailing practices continue to alienate and exclude rather than 
include citizens in the government and management of these services. It is important, 
however, to place this critique in historical perspective. It must be recognized that 
citizen participation has not been a characteristic of the ways in which water resources 
and WSS have been governed and managed in the past. As pointed out by Dryzek, in 
the tradition of administrative rationalism, the highly technocratic model of public 
service delivery that prevailed during much of the twentieth century and that has been 
the target of the public sector reforms since the 1980s, the organizing principle was 
“leave it to the experts”: citizens were expected to be passive and obedient beneficiaries 
(Dryzek, 1997). However, it must be also recognized that in the policies mainstreamed 
since the 1980s substantive citizenship continues to be excluded from the options 
available and the alternatives offered for people’s involvement are limited at best to 
their role of passive customers. 
In this regard, from the evidence gathered it emerges that “participation” often 
means willingness to accept decisions already taken with little or no consultation. This 
is not a new problem, and in most cases it could be observed that social struggles for the 
democratisation of the governance processes in the water sector and other areas of 
activity are of long standing, as vividly illustrated by the experiences of the Latin 
American countries examined here. Despite a limited degree of success achieved during 
the 1980s through the experience of decentralization in some countries, the persistence 
of paternalistic, clientelistic and authoritarian political arrangements continue to hinder 
the possibilities for deepening the exercise of substantive citizenship and democratic 
governance. 
 
 
 
3. 1. 4. 3. The incommensurability of values 
 
In the previous sections we have already pointed out the significance of the often 
conflicting traditions and cultural frameworks underscoring the ongoing 
transformations in the water sector and the frequent social conflicts arising from these 
policies. Schematically, we have considered a number of conflicting trends, including 
those involving: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
called Prometrópole, took place in Washington in November 2002, and the contract was finally signed on 
23 June 2003. 
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• administrative and economic rationalism 
• essentialist notions of “public inefficiency” and “private efficiency”  
• free-market liberal and alternative (e.g. social democratic, communitarian) 
notions of governance and citizenship 
• formal and substantive citizenship 
• WSS as public/social and private good 
• Western/developed country and developing country political traditions 
• “old” and “new” water culture    
 
A more in depth analysis would lead us not only to the extension of this list to 
embrace, for instance, the contradictions within both developed countries (e.g. between 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental European notions of state-civil society interactions or 
between the British and French business cultures seemingly leading the experiences of 
PSP in the global water sector) and developing countries (e.g. the cleavages within and 
between national and regional cultures and traditions), but also to explore the multi-
dimensional and multi-scale character of these processes, from local to global. 
Although these tasks are beyond the scope of this work, it is important to remind 
ourselves of the complexity characterizing the socio-cultural frameworks and traditions 
at play, which has been largely neglected in the design and implementation of the 
mainstream policy models examined in this project. 
In this connection, another frequent contradiction that can be discerned is 
between the constellations of values associated with water that has been observed 
among different social groups,63  even in the developed country cases, and the 
standardizing valuing criteria which are intrinsic to the process of water 
commodification informing the mainstream policy model studied here. Often, these 
policies have taken the form of a pretentious experiment of social engineering assuming 
that cultures and values associated with water can be transformed by decree and 
through legal-institutional change. This happened for instance during the 
implementation of the far-reaching reforms to the water sector in Mexico, when the 
government announced in 1993 that “water has ceased to be a free good and from now 
on it is a resource which has an economic value, and society must pay for it”.64 
However, things did not work out in that way, and people responded with a wide array 
of actions ranging from pacific bureaucratic demands and civil disobedience (e.g. non 
payment of water bills) to open and violent opposition to government policies through 
sabotaging water infrastructure (notoriously water meters), kidnapping water company 
employees, or destroying property. 
Let us now change the focus from the specific problems arising from the attempt 
to transform water from public or “social” good into a commodity, to the even more 
                                              
63 See Castro (2004b) for a more detailed account. 
64 CNA, 1993: 11; see also Rogozinsky, 1993; 1998. It is also important to point out here that assuming 
that water was free before these reforms is a fallacy, as for most people in Mexico water has already 
become an expensive commodity since long ago. 
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problematic policies oriented at reducing the multi-dimensional values associated with 
water to a market equivalent. This is not merely a technical problem –as some experts 
seem to understand it– that could be solved by carrying out an aggregation of benefits 
assessment, for instance by applying a survey among the users of a water course to find 
out their “willingness to pay”, and then use the results to estimate the market value of a 
river or spring,65 or as shown later through “stakeholder dialogue” to elicit consensus 
about paying more for water. However useful these techniques may be for providing 
criteria to support difficult policy decisions such as authorizing abstraction rights in 
endangered aquatic environments, the problem is that the results derived are often 
interpreted as representing people’s perceptions on a range of dimensions that are 
irreducible to the market sphere.66 Moreover, the actual usefulness of these techniques 
is cast into doubt when factors other than market-based efficiency criteria are 
introduced into the analysis to account for such issues as the conflicting cultural values 
and material interests held by different actors regarding issues of ecological 
sustainability and social equity.67 Moreover, different languages of valuation in mutual 
conflict often reflect far deeper confrontations about the control and distribution –the 
very “stuff” of governance– of water resources and WSS, a struggle often fought 
through the deployment of alternative and often irreconcilable value systems. 
Unfortunately, the mainstream policies promoting the expansion of PSP in the 
water sector have been largely informed by this one-dimensional thinking where 
market-based efficiency criteria override other considerations, including those of 
economic efficiency. An example in point is the interpretation given by pro-PSP 
reformers to the Fourth Principle of the Dublin Declaration adopted at the UN 
Conference on Water and the Environment (January 1992), which stated that “water has 
an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic 
good” (UN, 1992). The principle itself is quite ambiguous and leaves some room for 
different interpretations, but the following conclusions extracted from the principle 
illustrate the tendency towards market reductionism in mainstream water policy: 
 
finally, in the Dublin statement […] the rhetoric of international 
meetings on water resources management recognized that water is 
essentially an economic good. […] This is not a very new proposal. 
                                              
65 This type of experiment, for instance, was carried out in the Thames Basin (England) to solve a dispute 
between the private water company and the environmental regulator over abstraction rights and 
environmental protection in the River Kennet, a tributary of the Thames, in which the regulator lost the 
case against the private company. For a discussion of the technical aspects surrounding the case, see 
Bateman et. al. (2000). 
66 In the case of England, as briefly summarised in Box 2, this irreducible character of the 
multidimensional values associated with water was unearthed by another study funded by the private 
water industry that demonstrated the influence of social and cultural values in the behaviour of water 
users, which poses often intractable challenges to commercial approaches to water management (see 
Strang, 2004). 
67 For instance, see the analysis on the implications of applying one-dimensional cost-benefit analysis to 
the evaluation of alternative policy paths involving ecological distribution conflicts (Martínez-Alier, 
2002). 
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Economists interested in water resources management have long argued 
the necessity to recognize that water is an economic good and not to treat 
water as having “unique importance” but as one good among all others. 
[…] If water is an economic good then it should be possible to govern its 
allocation through the market (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998: 7).  
 
There has been a not-so-subtle displacement of meaning here, because 
recognizing that water has an economic value that has to be taken into consideration 
does not mean a) that this is the only value that counts and b) that, consequently, water 
should (could) be governed through the market. There is a double reductionism here: 
first the multidimensional values associated to water are reduced to the economic 
dimension, and second the economic dimension is reduced to the sub-dimension of 
market transactions. 
Aware of the dangers and actual failures derived from the inability of 
mainstream water policy to deal with the challenges posed by conflicting values and 
interests, water experts linked to the large multinational private companies in a joint 
effort with practitioners and academics have suggested the need for more sophisticated 
assessments of “the range of valuing perspectives” characterizing human relationships 
with water. “Societies”, we are told, “need to attach more importance to water, yet in 
recent times they have been reluctant to do so. In part this problem is due to different 
people or groups of people valuing water in different ways”.68 Leaving aside the 
controversial sweeping statement that societies are reluctant to attach more importance 
to water, the assessment of the problem of valuation offered by the paper is highly 
problematic in several respects. Despite the skilful description of the wide-ranging 
valuation systems and perception frameworks that they have identified in the countries 
where they operate, when it comes to the actual appraisal of the problem it soon 
becomes clear that what is been discussed is how to find a consensual mechanism 
(through dialogue) to negotiate the translation of “non market” into market values. The 
main problem, according to the authors, is “under investment in infrastructure, 
inadequate operation and maintenance, and inadequate funding for protection of natural 
water resources” (Moss et. al., 2003: 13). The sustainable solution suggested is to create 
a “virtuous spiral” consisting in the recognition of the “full costs and benefits” to be 
derived from valuing water more, which in this case means willing to pay more for it. 
To hammer down the message, they quote the declaration made by an Indian Minister 
at the World Economic Forum in Davos 2000, who said “The people are willing to pay, 
the problem is that we politicians are not willing to charge them” (Moss et. al., 2003: 
14). Another sweeping statement, in the light of the evidence showing people’s 
resistance to the commodification of WSS and the widespread problems of non 
payment detected. For instance, as shown in the recent price review carried out by the 
economic regulator OFWAT in England and Wales for the period 2005-2010, although 
politicians and regulators seem to be willing to charge people more in the face of the 
mounting investment needs facing the water companies, users’ unwillingness to pay –or 
                                              
68 Moss et. al., 2003: 7, 8. See also the presentation made by one the authors of the report at the Second 
PRINWASS International Conference in Mexico, in April 2003 (Wolff, 2003). 
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as a financial analyst put it, “political reasons”– have certainly played an important role 
in postponing the huge tariff increases requested by the private companies.69 These 
tough decisions that politicians face in wealthy countries like England are even more 
daunting in most developing countries, where willingness to pay can certainly not be 
associated with PSP expansion.   
In this connection, the results of market reductionism in water policy have been 
often catastrophic, as already exemplified with the paradigmatic cases of Cochabamba 
in Bolivia, but also in Argentina, Mexico and other countries. By catastrophic we do not 
only mean the painful impact of failure on the countries involved, which is the most 
obvious consequence if we think in terms of their chances for achieving the MDGs. It 
has been also catastrophic, from a certain perspective, for the private operators that 
have ventured into the programme of PSP expansion often with very limited knowledge 
and understanding of the local socio-political and cultural conditions. As a recent 
assessment by the Executive Vice-President of Suez put it,  
 
I would like to have a brief look back at 2002 and 2003, whose 
disastrous results shook our convictions to the core: The overly hasty 
expansion of water internationally ended in failures that were painful for 
all of us; ONDEO and SITA’s acquisitions of companies that should 
have been sources of growth instead generated losses or were a cause for 
concern. We were forced to pull out of unprofitable projects (Puerto 
Rico, Atlanta, etc.) and to sell part or all of companies such as 
Northumbrian and Cespa, whose development we were no longer able to 
finance. This sorely tried our nevertheless proven business models and 
our certainties (Chaussade, 2004).  
 
This experience of business failure is shared by others, to the point that the 
global water operators have been rapidly retreating from developing countries. In the 
words of a recent analysis, “Can anyone imagine investing hard currency in water 
projects in countries like the Philippines, Argentina and Bolivia now?” (Global Water 
Intelligence, 2004). This question provides an insight into the assessment that global 
water companies are making about the role that they can play in helping developing 
countries to achieve the MDGs.70 It also provides, mutatis mutandi, a contribution to 
our own evaluation of the claims made in mainstream WSS policies about the role of 
the private sector as a key provider of much needed investment for developing 
countries. 
Nevertheless, and to keep our discussion on track, the particular forms of PSP 
expansion implemented in the water and sanitation sector of developing countries since 
                                              
69 GWI (2004b). The private companies had requested an average increase of 31 percent but the regulator 
took the sector by surprise by only authorizing a 13 percent increase 
70 Another example was provided by the Corporate Social Responsibility Director of RWE-Thames 
Water, who stated that the company no longer has plans to invest in water projects in developing 
countries (Aylard, 2004). See also Global Water Report (2004) about RWE-Thames exit strategy from 
water projects in China and other countries. 
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the 1980s has also elicited strong reactions among the citizenry of these countries, 
which range from disappointment to outright contestation. For instance, recent evidence 
produced by the regular survey of public opinion in Latin America suggests that the 
already low acceptance of PSP policies among the public of the region has been 
worsening in recent years. Table 11 shows the results per country and also the total 
average for Latin America. 
 
 
Table 11. Evolution of public support for PSP in Latin America* (1998-2003) 
                     1998           2002          2003 
 
Costa Rica  60  32    - 
Brazil   51  38  33 
Venezuela  51  38  32 
Mexico  49  28  31 
Chile   51  22  29 
Honduras  47  34  25 
Colombia  39  23  24 
Paraguay  46  19  23 
Peru   44  32  22 
Ecuador  52  40  20 
Nicaragua  46  30  20 
Bolivia   49  23  19 
Guatemala  62  29  16 
Uruguay  29  16  16 
El Salvador  54  35  15 
Argentina  32  14  12 
Panama  20  31  10 
    
Latin America  46  28  22 
 
 
Source: Lagos (2004). 
 
* Percentage of positive responses to the question: “Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following phrases that I am going to read: The 
privatization of state companies has been beneficial to the country.” The table only shows results for the 
responses “Strongly Agree” and “Somewhat Agree”. 
 
Although some analysts have tried to dismiss the evidence suggesting growing 
dissatisfaction with PSP, which –and more worryingly– is also associated with a 
growing disenchantment with the democratic political system,71 the figures project a 
                                              
71 According to the Latinobarómetro survey, between 1996 and 2003 there has been a decrease in the 
support for democracy in 14 out of the 17 countries covered by the study. Among the countries studied in 
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strong pattern which is similar for most countries and is consistent with the findings of 
our research. This development also offers strong counterevidence to another claim 
made in the mainstream WSS literature that we examine in our project: that the 
expansion of PSP would promote democratization in developing countries.  
                                                                                                                                      
PRINWASS, the figures were: Argentina from 71 percent in 1996 to 58 percent in 2003; Brazil from 50 
percent to 35 percent; and Bolivia, from 64 percent to 50 percent. Mexico has remained stable at 53 
percent (Lagos, 2004). 
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Conclusions 
 
Summing up, our conclusions from this evaluation of PSP policies on the basis of the 
case study material cast light on the observed trends and patterns in the water and 
sanitation sector and on the role that PSP can play in achievement of the MDGs. As 
discussed earlier, the theoretical and empirical evidence does not support the claim that 
PSP produces higher levels of efficiency than public operators in the provision of WSS. 
When we observe the whole cycle of the production and distribution of WSS from 
intake to safe wastewater disposal, private operators tend to fairly poorly in comparison 
with public companies. While private operators tend to concentrate their investments in 
enhancing the commercial aspects of the business (e.g. metering and expanding 
coverage for drinking water), as a trend they neglect much needed investment in 
infrastructure renewal and in the overall management of wastewater. There is no 
evidence in our cases that private operators pay adequate attention to demand 
management initiatives, environmental planning, or integrated management of natural 
resources –that are core components of sustainability strategies–, even when these 
activities are stipulated by contract or otherwise subject to strict regulation. 
Rather than being driven by a genuine search for efficiency improvements and 
expansion of services to the poor, mainstream PSP policies form part of a pendular 
cycle between private and public-sector expansion that has been closely intertwined 
with transformations in the socio-economic structures of the leading capitalist countries. 
While during much of the twentieth century, and especially since the post Second 
World War period, the state was given a central role as the key economic actor, by the 
early 1970s significant changes in the global economy completely transformed the 
relative weight of the state vis a vis other actors, in particular the transnationalized 
private sector. One of the most significant consequences of these water policies, largely 
inspired by free-market liberalism, has been the attempt to radically transform the 
structure of governance of WSS, which had traditionally been developed around the 
principles that these are a) essential services that b) have to be universally available 
and, therefore c) provided under strict public sector control or directly by the public 
sector. Under the conditions prevailing internationally since the 1980s, attempts have 
been made to reorganize the governance of WSS around market principles, reducing 
state control over private operators to a minimum and transforming the status of WSS 
from essential public services into commodities. 
However, this has not been a linear process and has not produced a uniform 
model. Despite some common “megatrends” (e.g. the monopolization of the private 
water market by a handful of multinational operators, mainly European) we have also 
found differences and diversity in policies and strategies between and within countries 
and regions. Even within the key institutions that have promoted the model since the 
1980s, like the World Bank, there exist internal tensions and debate which have 
produced a diversity of outcomes. While during the 1990s critics of the model (for 
instance within the Bank) were few and their voices very moderate, since 2002 the 
dissent has been more open and louder. Finally, in its World Development Report 2004 
the World Bank has openly admitted that water policy, in the face of the challenges 
assumed by the international community in relation to the MDGS, cannot be grounded 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page82 
on a market-centred structure of governance nor that the private sector can be 
considered to be the main actor for universalising WSS in developing countries. 
With hindsight, it is clear that these changes may be related to the recurrent 
failures experienced by projects involving private sector participation in WSS during 
the 1990s, and to the increasing reluctance of private water companies to engage in the 
provision of WSS in developing countries owing to the financial and political risks 
involved. As it could have been predicted from the historical record of private sector 
participation in WSS, although private operators may be willing to undertake the 
provision of these services in conditions that guarantee a sustained return for their 
shareholders, countries cannot rely on private operators for the expansion and 
maintenance of WSS to the large population in developing countries who have limited 
(often poor) or no access to these services. These are normally the poorer sectors of the 
population, a large proportion of who live in extreme poverty, who could barely afford 
to pay for WSS at their true international market price (and often not even at their cost-
recovery price), and whose situation has been systematically worsened throughout the 
1990s owing to increasing inequality and deprivation. 
Furthermore, there is a continuity of a long standing tradition in the provision of 
WSS (whether publicly or privately organized): despite the rhetoric of “civil society” 
participation that has become a key element in current water policy programmes, citizen 
involvement continues to be limited or non existent. This is particularly true in the case 
of developing countries, but it can also be detected in the developed country cases that 
we consider in our project. In the extreme, the absence of channels for adequate citizen 
involvement (or the actual denial of the right to be involved) has been responsible for 
bitter confrontations in many cases involving the particular forms of private sector 
participation in WSS promoted since the 1980s, which has led to the collapse of 
concessions, violence, political crisis, destruction of property and, most regrettably, the 
loss of human life. 
As a result of the failures and highly conflictive situations created, promoters of 
(for-profit) PSP increasingly recognise the need to take into account the socio-cultural 
and political conditions when designing water and sanitation policies. This change has 
been reflected among other issues in new programmes to develop “partnerships” 
between the private sector and other actors, especially “public-private partnerships” and 
“tri-partite partnerships” (between the public, private, and voluntary sectors). However, 
the unawareness or even disregard for the socio-political and cultural contexts in the 
programmes promoting PSP in WSS has been a crucial factor in the large number of 
highly controversial experiences and failures recorded since the 1980s. In many cases, 
this has led to bitter conflicts and to the collapse or early abortion of programmes 
involving PSP (especially with foreign private operators) in the provision of WSS. In 
the institutional dimension, the weakness of even absence of adequate legislation and 
regulatory frameworks has been a recurrent problem in the cases studied, which is 
confirmed by research carried out by peers. In some cases countries have reformed the 
legislation (e.g. water laws) to facilitate the expansion of PSP in WSS in ways that 
showed little regard for important considerations such as ecological sustainability (e.g. 
water resources conservation) and socio-political accountability (e.g. mechanisms to 
protect citizens’ rights in their role as users of WSS). In most developing country cases 
PSP was introduced in the absence of any regulatory structures and institutions, while 
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little attention has been paid to local capacity building in the public sector to strengthen 
institutional capabilities for regulation and control. As a rule PSP contracts for WSS 
have been kept away from public scrutiny, and crucial information needed for effective 
monitoring of compliance by private operators is not available in the public domain (it 
is considered the private property of the companies). 
At the heart of the problem, in our perspective, there is a confrontation between 
alternative models of governance, structured around competing principles, which in the 
current historical stage have taken the form of a confrontation between a revival of 
market-centred governance against the pre-existing model of state-centred governance 
that had prevailed in the WSS sector for most of the twentieth century. In this regard, 
one of the crucial questions that need to be answered is what were the theoretical, 
historical, and empirical grounds supporting the notion that the failure of state-centred 
governance in the WSS of developing countries could be solved by radically 
transferring the role of the state to monopoly private companies. The evidence gathered 
in the project work leaves little doubt that there was scant historical support for these 
arguments, and the new evidence produced about the most recent wave of PSP in the 
water and sanitation sector strongly disproves the claims that the chronic WSS 
problems facing developing countries can be resolved by relying on the private sector. 
In this regard, the evidence is very consistent, whether we look at the socio-political 
aspects or at the economic-financial, socio-economic, demo-geographic, and even 
techno-infrastructural dimensions of PSP expansion in the water and sanitation sector 
since the 1980s as addressed by other project reports. The main trends identified in our 
research suggest that achieving the goals of the international community to halve the 
world population without access to WSS by 2015 will not be possible by relying on the 
private sector, which is already accepted by some global water companies. Full 
universal coverage worldwide by 2025, on a sustainable basis (economic-financial, 
ecological, and political), seems to be extremely Utopian to be discussed under the 
present circumstances. 
Nevertheless, this has been a highly dynamic process, with frequent changes in 
direction and a very unclear horizon in terms of where will the system move next. On 
the one hand, despite the arrogant neglect of citizen preferences and opinions, 
especially but not only in poor developing countries, there has been mounting 
dissatisfaction and open defiance to the PSP policies in many countries. It would be a 
mistake to explain this opposition as a mere rejection of market policies or PSP, as in 
fact there was some degree of support among important sectors in the early 1990s, for 
instance in countries like Argentina. However, the convergence of, among other issues, 
undemocratic decision making and implementation and lack of participation, the 
widespread perception of public and private corruption in the negotiation of concession 
contracts, and the increasing evidence that the PSP model privileges the interests of the 
private operators rather than the needs of the communities, contributed to the observed 
marked decline in acceptance or at least tolerance of PSP and to the mushrooming of 
public protest, civil disobedience, and even violence against the model. 
There are many other elements that we have considered, such as the 
multidimensionality of values and cultural factors affecting WSS, not just in developing 
countries, but will not repeat here for the sake of clarity and brevity. Let us close this 
report by emphasising some of the key lessons that can be learnt from this experience in 
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order to think ahead and contribute to the positive construction of feasible alternatives. 
In this regard, we have insisted in the need to give centrality to the political dimension 
for understanding the historical success of past WSS policies, which achieved universal 
coverage on the basis of principles whereby social rights and the common good were 
given priority over market interests. These policies and the principles that inspired them 
were accepted and supported by a wide range of social and political forces, even by 
sectors that in other respects defended free-market liberalism but accepted that WSS 
required different arrangements. It is our hypothesis that achieving success in the design 
and implementation of present and future WSS policies as those required to meet the 
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can only be achieved through the 
amalgamation of a similarly broad and universalistic set of social forces, not just 
composed by the illuminated elites but also able to incorporate the large sectors 
currently excluded or marginalized. The good news is that these processes are already 
taking place, however imperfect or limited they might be. Critically supporting them 
and contributing to their multiplication and expansion is also an intensely political 
endeavor. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix A1 – Operationalization of the analytical dimensions 
 
Environmental dimension 
a. Extension (km2) and components of the catchment area 
i. main water sources 
o  aquifers, rivers, etc. 
ii. water volumes available (normally expressed as annual average) (changes 
over the last 30 years approx.; projected trends) 
iii. raw water characteristics (changes over the last 30 years approx.; 
projected trends) 
b. Precipitation (mm per year) in the catchment area (changes over the last 30 
years approx.; projected trends) 
i. Average annual precipitation 
ii. Seasonal cycles (e.g. average in the dry season, rain season, etc.) 
c. Temperature in the catchment area (changes over the last 30 years approx.; 
projected trends). 
i. Average 
ii. Seasonal variation 
d. Main environmental processes at work in/on the catchment area that have or 
might have direct consequences on WSS 
i. Depletion of water tables through overpumping (depletion rates) 
ii. Raising water tables owing to deindustrialisation or other processes 
iii. Reduction in river flows owing to over abstraction, deforestation, etc. 
iv. Pollution of water sources (main polluters [industry, urban wastewater, 
etc.], estimated impact of polluters [%], etc.) 
v. Other 
e. Alternative water resources being/to be developed within the catchment 
(expected volumes, etc.) 
i. New surface/underground waters  
ii. Reclamation of wastewater (water recycling) 
iii. Rainwater harvesting 
iv. Desalinization 
v. Other (develop accordingly) 
f. Inter-basin resources 
i. Water imports / inter-basin transfers 
ii. Water sources from outside the catchment being tapped for supplying 
WSS in the urban area 
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iii. (Volumes involved (changes over the last 30 years approx.; projected 
trends) 
 
g. Water abstractions (latest year for which data are available) 
i. Volumes abstracted per source (annual average); 
ii. Percentage of total abstractions per source [e.g. abstractions from the river 
Thames amount for 85% of total abstractions in the Thames catchment]) 
iii. Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts for i. and ii. 
h. Water use per activity (volumes and relative %) (latest year for which data are 
available) 
i. Domestic consumption 
ii. Industry 
iii. Agriculture (especially irrigation) 
iv. Other (disaggregate if possible) 
v. Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts for i-iv. 
i. Wastewater per activity (estimated volumes of wastewater produced [distinguish 
between actual wastewater and stormwater] and relative %) (latest year for which 
data are available) 
i. Domestic 
ii. Industry 
iii. Agriculture 
iv. Other (disaggregate if possible) 
v. Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts for i-iv. 
j. Wastewater treatment and disposal 
i. Type of wastewater treatment applied [primary, secondary, or tertiary 
treatment]) 
ii. Estimated volumes of wastewater treated before been released back into 
the environment. 
iii. Impact of wastewater disposal (e.g. use in irrigation [volumes]; where is it 
disposed [river, sea, lakes, etc.], etc.) 
iv. Main characteristics of wastewater 
1. Quality of wastewater before treatment (main quality parameters, 
seasonal variations, etc.) 
2. Current wastewater standards (discharge limits for selected 
parameters [e.g. BOD, COD, phosphorus, nitrogen, suspended 
solids, nitrates, etc.]) (these should be available from the relevant 
water authority) 
3. Level of compliance with the standards (also normally available 
from the water authority) 
v. Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts for i-iii. 
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* * * * * 
 
Socio-economic and demo-geographic dimension 
 
• Demo-geographic trends 
i. Population 
o Population figures 
 Gender distribution 
 Age distribution 
o Growth rates (natural; migration) 
o Household information (types and percentages)  
ii. Spatial distribution of the population in the area 
o urban 
o rural 
o concentration patterns (density) 
o impact of population on water resources (size, location) 
iii. Development patterns 
o Urban development (growth rates, actual expansion) 
o Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts 
• Socio-economic trends 
i. Economic activities (%) 
ii. Employment 
iii. Level of activity 
iv. GDP (total and per activity) (total and per capita) 
v. Income distribution patterns 
vi. Poverty patterns 
vii. Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts  
• Water-related health trends 
viii. Impact of water-related diseases (trends) 
o Main profile of water-related diseases affecting the area 
o Morbitity rates (adult, infant) 
o Mortality rates (adult, infant) 
 
 
* * * * * 
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Techno-infrastructural dimension 
• Characteristics of the system’s infrastructure  
i. Water intake and treatment 
o Intakes, pumping systems, reservoirs, treatment plants, etc.  
o Approximate age and condition of the infrastructure 
o Recent trends (renewal programmes, extensions) 
o Forecasted needs (renewal, upgrading, etc.) 
ii. Water supply network 
o Extension and physical characteristics (mains, secondary networks, 
etc.) 
o Approximate age of the network (obsolescence; losses, etc.) 
o Recent trends (renewal programmes, extensions) 
o Forecasted needs (renewal, extension, etc.) 
iii. Wastewater network 
o Extension and physical characteristics (mains, secondary networks, 
treatment plants, etc.) 
o Approximate age of the network (obsolescence; losses, etc.) 
o Recent trends (renewal programmes, extensions) 
iv. Wastewater treatment 
o Extension and physical characteristics (lagoons, treatment plants etc.) 
o Approximate age and condition of the infrastructure 
o Recent trends (renewal programmes, extensions) 
o Forecasted needs (renewal, upgrading, etc.) 
v. Stormwater sewerage 
o Extension and physical characteristics (lagoons, treatment plants etc.) 
o Approximate age and condition of the infrastructure 
o Recent trends (renewal programmes, extensions) 
o Forecasted needs (renewal, upgrading, etc.) 
• Technological Links and Potential for Local Development  
i. Source of the technology for the original systems 
o water supply and sanitation networks (mains; pumping stations, etc.) 
o treatment plants (drinking water; wastewater) 
o other (e.g. aqueducts, dams, etc.) 
ii. Source of the technology for any updating and extensions to the original 
systems (as in i.) 
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iii. Potential for alternative technological development 
o Technologies available locally (in use or not) 
 Feasibility of use 
 Economic, financial or other constraints 
o South-South technological links (as alternative to North-South) 
 Feasibility of implementation 
 Economic, financial or other constraints 
• Technical capacity  
iv. Availability of human resources 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
Legal-institutional and policy dimension 
• Legal environment  
i. Water law 
o Main characteristics of the country’s water law that affect private 
sector participation in the provision of WSS (pay also attention to any 
provincial or lower level legislation that might have importance in 
your case study [e.g. in Argentina, provincial laws often differ from 
the national code and have more importance at the local level]) 
 Legal status of water resources ownership (private, public, 
etc.) 
 Water rights (formal, informal or traditional) 
o Abstraction rights 
o Wastewater disposal rights 
o Recent trends (approx. last 30 years but also pay attention to earlier 
processes if relevant) 
 Changes to water law (e.g. changing the legal status of water 
to create water markets)  
o Forecasted or expected trends in water law 
 Ongoing or expected changes (e.g. changing the legal status 
of water to create water markets)  
ii. Relevant water-related laws 
o Health law 
 Components of health legislation that impinge on WSS (e.g. 
obligation of the providers of WSS to ensure the provision 
of safe WSS; prohibition of disconnection of water supply in 
case of non payment by domestic users) 
o Public utility laws or similar laws that rule the provision of WSS 
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 E.g. Public infrastructure laws; laws allocating responsibility 
for WSS to provincial, municipal or similar bodies, etc. 
o Laws directed at promoting Private Sector Participation in WSS 
 Objectives and criteria 
 Legal mechanisms 
  rights and duties of the private operator 
 distribution of risk costs 
o Recent trends in water-related legislation other than water law 
(approx. last 30 years but also pay attention to earlier processes if 
relevant) 
 
• Regulatory environment (regulatory structures [national, regional or local 
level, as it may correspond]), especially with relation to private sector 
involvement 
i. Environmental regulation (water resources management, abstractions, 
wastewater discharges, etc.) 
o Institutions 
 Mandate 
 Functions 
 Degree of autarchy in relation to the regulated companies 
and the political system 
 Funding 
 Monitoring of the regulatory bodies 
 Users’ organizations  
o Main characteristics (objectives, standards, enforcement mechanisms, 
etc.) 
 E.g. Demand management policies (e.g. metering, recycling, 
water-saving programmes, etc.; economic instruments 
(creation of property rights; enforcement of green taxes; 
polluter pay principle, etc.) 
ii. Water services quality regulation (drinking water standards, wastewater 
standards, environmental impact standards, service standards, 
infrastructure renewal standards, etc.) 
o Institutions 
 Mandate 
 Functions 
 Degree of autarchy in relation to the regulated companies 
and the political system 
 Funding 
 Monitoring of the regulatory bodies 
 Users’ organizations  
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o Main characteristics (objectives, standards, enforcement mechanisms, 
etc.) 
 E.G. policies for the expansion of the system 
iii. Ownership regulation 
o Institutions 
 Mandate 
 Functions 
 Degree of autarchy in relation to the regulated companies 
and the political system 
 Funding 
 Monitoring of the regulatory bodies 
 Users’ organizations  
o Main characteristics (objectives, standards, enforcement mechanisms, 
etc.) 
 E.g. restrictions to horizontal integration or conglomeration, 
etc. 
iv. Economic regulation (financial and business performance of the water 
utilities, tariffs, etc.) 
o Institutions 
 Mandate 
 Functions 
 Degree of autarchy in relation to the regulated companies 
and the political system 
 Funding 
 Monitoring of the regulatory bodies 
 Users’ organizations  
o Main characteristics (objectives, standards, enforcement mechanisms, 
etc.) 
 Direct or indirect regulation of the profit rate 
 Incentives structure (cross-subsidisation, metering, etc.) 
 Cost recovery policies; pricing mechanisms; etc. 
 Investment (types) (quantitative and qualitative goals, 
financial and control mechanisms 
 Antimonopoly regulation 
v. Recent trends and expected changes in the regulatory environment 
(approx. last 30 years but also pay attention to earlier processes if 
relevant) 
 
• Organizational environment (market structure) 
i. Organization of networked WSS 
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o Type of organization (characteristics, synthetic history, etc.) 
 Public company (state, municipal, etc.) 
 Private operator (specify the modality of operation [full 
ownership, time-limited concession, partial concession] or 
type of contract) (also if it is national, foreign, part of larger 
business group, etc.) 
 Co-operatives (specify the main characteristics, as under this 
heading there could be very different organizational forms) 
 Neighbourhood or community organizations (also specify 
their characteristics) 
 Other 
 
ii. Organization of non-networked WSS (e.g. distribution of water with 
tankers) 
o Classification as in i). 
iii. Informal arrangements 
o Private or community wells 
o Other traditional or informal water uses and institutions 
 
• Policy environment  
i. Policies oriented at promoting private sector participation in WSS 
o History and context of the policy 
o Objectives (explicit or implicit) 
o Main actors (winners, losers, etc.) 
o Citizen participation 
o Public debate on the policy/cies  
ii. Tax policy 
o As in i). 
 
• Water supply services (latest year for which data are available) 
i. Number of connections (domestic, industrial, commercial, etc.) 
ii. Water supplied (billed water; “unaccounted for water” [water “lost” – 
provide the local definition for unaccounted for water])  
iii. Population covered (actual figures and percentages) 
o Population served by each different type of coverage such as in-
house connection [networked], in the plot; by private water 
vendors, municipal tankers, etc. 
iv. Drinking water quality 
o current standards being applied 
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o quality differentials between different types of coverage (e.g. 
between networked water and water provided by water vendors 
or municipal tankers) (if available) 
v. Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts for i-ii. 
 
• Wastewater services (latest year for which data are available) 
i. Number of connections (domestic, industrial, commercial, etc.) 
ii. Population covered (actual figures and percentages) 
o Population served by each different type of coverage such as in-
house connection [networked sewerage], municipal collection, 
dry latrines, etc. 
iii. Recent trends (approx 30 years) and forecasts. 
 
 
Economic-financial dimension 
• Financial mechanisms (services and infrastructure)   
i. Self-sufficient (funding generated by revenues or other user-based 
systems [e.g. cost-recovery instruments]) 
ii. State funding 
o Subsidies 
o Low-rate loans 
o Debt-based 
o Other 
iii. International funding 
o Loans 
o Grants (donors) 
o Private investment 
o Other 
iv. Alternative sources 
 
• Pricing systems (recent evolution and prospects)  
i. Prices 
o By type of services 
o Billing systems 
o Price discrimination (monopoly) 
ii. Tariff structures 
o Service 
o Fixed costs 
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o Profit rates 
o Other 
• Investment (recent evolution and prospects)  
i. Business strategies 
ii. Level of investment (targeted and actual figures) 
o Type of investment 
o Service sector targeted 
o Financial mechanism 
iii. Level of reinvestment 
 
• Socio-economic impact (recent evolution and prospects)  
i. Impact on direct and indirect employment (sectors linked in the 
productive chain) 
ii. Impact of the cost of the WSS on income distribution 
o e.g. in relation to the minimum salaries, basic basket indicators, etc. 
o by social sectors 
iii. Competitiveness 
o Evolution of prices (water and sanitation) for non-domestic users in 
relation to the evolution of the retail price index 
o Comparability of profit rates with international standards 
iv. Impact on the external account of the economy 
o Level of indebtedness 
o Level of capital inflows 
o Imports 
o Degree of local integration in the production of inputs and capital 
goods related to WSS 
v. Public finance 
o Taxes 
o Subsidies 
o Impact of intra-corporate relations on the goods and capital markets 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
Socio-political and cultural dimension 
• Water (and Environmental) Governance   
i. Decision making processes in the WSS sector 
o Government structures and modalities 
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 Water bureaucracy 
 Main actors (engineers, accountants, etc.)  
 Degree of expertise 
 Traditional roles 
 Degree of political influence [e.g. through 
corporate representation, etc.])  
 Prevailing political culture 
 Administrative rationalism 
 Clientelism 
 Other 
o Private sector profile 
 Prevailing business culture in the WSS 
 Competitive 
 State-led or state protected 
 Other 
o Community and “civil society” forms 
 Degree of involvement of community and civil society 
organizations in WSS 
 In the organization and delivery of WSS 
 In the WSS policy making processes 
 In user protection (monitoring of the service, etc.) 
 Other 
• Socio-economic and cultural values attached to water   
i. Concept and traditions of water as a public good; notions of common pool 
resource, toll goods, and private goods 
ii. Gender-related perceptions and values of water 
iii. Economic values attached to water 
o Attitudes towards cost-recovery policies, commodification, etc. 
iv. Cultural (or religious) values attached to water 
o Traditional uses of water (e.g. indigenous customs) 
o Non-capitalist Western and non-western notions of water and ‘nature’ 
 
• Social and political conflicts around WSS   
i. Social and political conflicts around WSS 
o Ongoing or potential conflicts around 
 Access to the services 
 Quality of the services 
 Management of the services (including pricing) 
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 Political aspects of the services (e.g. disputes over the actual 
organization and running of the WSS; opposition to private 
sector participation [especially privatization])  
o Conflict forms (actions)  
 Bureaucratic complaints 
 Public protest 
 Direct action (e.g. civil disobedience [e.g. non-payment of 
water bills], destruction of property [e.g. of water meters], 
personal attacks [e.g. kidnapping of water vendors or water 
officers]) 
 Political organization (through formal or informal channels)   
o Conflict resolution mechanisms 
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Appendix A2 - Table A1. Investment obligations and actual achievements in a selected group of cases 
City/Region - Company Investment Obligations Achievements and failures 
 
AASA (Buenos Aires) The licensee originally agreed to invest 3.95 billion dollars 
during the 30 years of the license. 
The target for 2002 was to extend coverage of water supply 
and sewerage to 88 percent and 74 percent of the population 
respectively. 
According to the private operator, between 1993 and 1999, investments 
reached US$ 678 million for network expansion; US$ 211 million for 
renewal, and US$ 158 million for other concepts. By 2002, nearly 3 
million new users had been incorporated. 
According to the regulator ETOSS the level of non-compliance with the 
investments committed by contract reached 42 percent during 1993-98 
and 33 percent between 1999-2002. The actual coverage achieved was 79 
percent for water supply and 63 percent for sewerage. 
 
Aguas del Aconquija 
(Tucumán) 
The targets agreed by contract starting in 1995 were to 
achieve full coverage for water and sewerage after 8 and 13 
years, respectively, from around 80 percent and 35 percent 
(the level of coverage existing in the early 1990s). 
When the concession was cancelled in 1997 investment in expansion had 
been virtually null.  
EYDAP (Athens)  EYDAP agreed to invest near to 1.2 billion Euros between 
2000 and 2008. 
Coverage in Athens was already close to universal before the introduction 
of PSP in 1999.  
The pattern has been one of non compliance with the investment targets 
(e.g. in 2000 investments were 20 million lower than agreed), although we 
were unable to access the actual figures. 
The private managers of the company blame the Greek government for 
the lack of compliance, as it is responsible for subsidising around 60 
percent of the investments). 
CAASA (Aguascalientes) The original contract obligations agreed in 1993 (to which 
we did not have access) were significantly reduced after a 
contract renegotiation in 1996 resulting from the financial 
collapse of 1994. The bulk of investment in infrastructure 
and the whole sewerage sector were taken back by the public 
sector. 
 
The investments made from 1993-1999 reached 110 million pesos (nearly 
12 million dollars).  The company reduced residential leaks and increased 
metering. However, essential infrastructure renewal to reduce water losses 
has not taken place. 
The level of coverage was already high before the introduction of PSP and 
was increased between 1990 and 2000 from 96 and 93 percent for water 
and sewerage respectively to 98 and 97 percent. 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
 
City/Region - Company Investment Obligations Achievements and failures 
 
Aguas del Tunari (1999-2000)  
(Cochabamba) 
The initial investment obligations totalled 214 million 
dollars (the investments planned included an extension of the 
drinking water network and the construction of a new water 
treatment plant, the extension of another network, the 
creation of crude dyke water plus the installation of pipelines 
from Misicuni to the valley of Cochabamba, more drinking 
water and irrigation, and the generation of electric energy).  
There were no investments in the brief period of the concession before it 
was cancelled. 
Aguas de Limeira Originally, the licensee agreed to make investments totalling 
98 million dollars (35 percent of these during the first five 
years of the license). 
The original obligations were not fully met by the company when rates 
were not adjusted.  In 2002, investments totalled 9 million Reais (around 3 
million dollars); nearly 60 percent went to the sewer system, a little over 
20 percent to providing drinking water, and the remaining 20 percent to 
other ends. 
Although targets for coverage were set, it was later discovered during a 
judicial review that the targets originally agreed had already been 
accomplished by the public sector before the concession. 
Águas de Niterói  The original commitment for the 30 year period of the 
concession was over 100 million dollars, with 60 percent of 
that figure being invested during the first 3 years (1998-
2001). Around 25 percent of the funding would be provided 
by the National Development Bank of Brazil and the 
remainder from revenues and own capital. 
During the first 2 years investments reached around 50 percent of the 
total, on target for the agreed 60 percent for the first 3 years. 
The target for expanding water supply and metering was achieved, 
reaching 98 percent of coverage and 82.5 percent of connections metered. 
Regarding sewerage, like in the case of Limeira here the original target set 
for the private operator had already been achieved by the public sector 
before the concession was granted (the target was to achieve 60 percent of 
coverage by 2002 but in 1991 coverage was already 66 percent). 
The target for reducing physical losses from 34 percent to 25 percent has 
not been met, as the main investments have been concentrating in 
expanding water supply and metering. 
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   Table A2. Characteristics of the tariff structures (examples) 
 
City/Region – Company Principal characteristics of the rate structure 
AASA (Buenos Aires) From the start in 1993, a “K” factor was used to take into account 
the area, age and built surface of the building, plus a fixed charge 
for infrastructure costs. After the infrastructure charge was 
eliminated in 1997, other fixed charges were incorporated (SUMA 
= universal service and environment; CIS = charge for service 
incorporation; CMC = maintenance charge for connections; CIA =  
charge for additional income. In addition, users must also pay the 
VAT (21 percent) and the regulatory fee (2.7 percent of the bill). 
Aguas del Aconquija 
(Tucumán) (1995-7) 
The rate structure was similar to AASA 
EYDAP (Athens)  There are four large categories: residential (with five strata of 
average consumption), industrial (with two segments, either less or 
more than 1,000 m3/month), and the public and municipal sectors. 
Before the introduction of PSP in 1999 there was a high “penalty” 
for residential users who exceeded 27 m3/month. These 
characteristics have been maintained throughout the past few years, 
but the gap between the different rates with respect to municipal 
buildings has shrunk substantially. 
SEMAPA (Cochabamba)  The categories are defined for charging rates under a system of 
meters and the following is a description of the structure.  
Residential categories (R1, R2, R3, R4) are differentiated according 
to plot surface, number of floors, number of water points, and the 
state and quality of the building.  Special categories are classified 
as commercial, special commercial, public, industrial and 
preferential, according to the type of water use (human 
consumption, raw material used to transform products) and 
according to the property (business, public nature, or social 
purposes). 
Aguas de Limeira Four categories were established: industrial (rate 147 percent 
higher than for residential users), commercial (129 percent higher), 
public (23 percent higher) and residential.  In all cases, the rate 
level is progressive according to consumption levels. 
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Table A3 Sequence of policy reforms and PSP events in the case studies 
 
YEAR 
 
COUNTRY 
 
KEY POLICY 
 
PSP EVENT 
1972-82 Tanzania “Decentralization” programme 
actually consisting in 
regionalization and centralization, 
abolishing local government 
authorities 
 
1974 England and 
Wales 
Water Act regionalizes WSS by 
collapsing thousands of small 
utilities into 10 basin-wide Regional 
Water Authorities 
 
1980 Greece The Athens WSS utility that had 
been in private hands through 
concession since 1928 becomes a 
“corporatized utility” directly 
dependent of the federal 
government. In the rest of the 
country WSS are run by 
municipalities. 
 
1980 Argentina Decentralization of WSS from 
federal to provincial level 
 
1982 Tanzania Local Government Acts to 
reintroduce local government 
authorities (abolished in the 1970s) 
 
1983 Mexico Reform to Article 115 of the 
Constitution introduces 
municipalization of WSS 
 
1983 England and 
Wales 
Water Act further curtails local 
authority involvement in the 
governance and management of 
WSS  
 
1984 Tanzania Constitutional reform sanctioning 
the reintroduction lo local 
government authorities 
 
1985-
1989 
Bolivia First stage of the Structural 
Adjustment economic reforms 
preparing the ground for PSP 
expansion  
 
1986 Kenya Announcement of decentralization 
and commercialisation of WSS, 
supported by the German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)  
 
1988 Brazil 1988 Constitution introduces 
decentralization and 
municipalization of WSS 
 
1989 Argentina Federal State Reform Law  
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promoting full-scale privatization 
1989 England and 
Wales 
Water Act creating 10 privately 
owned WSS utilities to replace the 
Regional Water Authorities.   
In the Thames basin, including the 
London Metropolitan Area, Thames 
Water plc is appointed for 25 years 
(there is no bidding process) to replace 
the Thames Water Authority 
1989 Mexico Creation of National Water 
Commission (CNA); launching of 
“New Water Culture” to cancel 
notion of public good and 
introducing market framework in 
WSS 
 
1990 Brazil Creation of the Modernization 
Programme for the Sanitation Sector 
(PMSS) with World Bank funding, 
oriented at promoting PSP 
 
1991 Argentina PRONAPAC Plan launched by 
federal government to fund water 
and sanitation works, with support 
from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). The plan 
conditioned loans to the 
privatization of the provincial WSS. 
 
1991 Bolivia National Basic Sanitation Plan, part 
of the measures envisaged in the 
Structural Adjustment reforms, with 
explicit reference to privatization 
plans for WSS 
Creation of the Ministry of Urban 
Affairs, including a National Basic 
Sanitation Department (DINASBA) 
aimed at enhancing the institutional 
importance of WSS 
Specification of functions for Water 
Administrative Entities in the Basic 
Sanitation sector, opening the field 
for PSP in WSS  
 
1992 Mexico Reform to Article 27 of the 
Constitution to allow creation of 
land and water markets 
New Water Law promoting PSP  
 
1993 Mexico Aguascalientes State Water Law 
reformed to allow PSP in WSS 
Concession contract of Aguascalientes 
City WSS for 20 years. 
The contract was revised in 1996, 
reducing the investment commitments 
of the operator and extending the 
period to 30 years 
1993 Argentina Law 6445 in Tucuman province  
 WATERLAT-GOBACIT Network Working Papers 
Research Projects Series SPIPRW – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 3 No 2 
 
Castro, José Esteban 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT Research Network 
 
5th Floor Claremont Bridge Building, NE1 7RU Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
    E-mail: redwaterlat@gmail.com – Web page: www.waterlat.org 
Page102 
allows privatization of WSS 
1993 Argentina  Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area WSS 
are granted in concession for 30 years. 
1993-
1997 
Bolivia “Second generation” Structural 
Adjustment reforms, based on large-
scale privatization and 
decentralization. 
 
1994 Argentina Chaco province seeks to reform the 
provincial constitution to allow 
privatization. The electorate votes 
massively against and privatization 
of WSS is forbidden by the 
provincial constitution. As a result, 
Chaco is excluded from the federal 
PRONAPAC plan launched in 1991 
with IDB support. 
 
1995 Argentina  Tucuman province’s WSS granted in 
concession for 30 years. The contract 
was cancelled in 1997 owing to 
ongoing conflicts over the quality and 
affordability of the service. The 
concessionaire sued the federal 
government of Argentina before the 
ICSID for 300 million dollars, and the 
litigation continues. 
1995 Brazil Federal Law of Concessions 
promoting PSP 
 
1995 Brazil  Services concession in Limeira (Sao 
Paulo state) for 30 years 
1996 Greece Federal Law for the Modernization 
of Public Utility Companies 
promoting PSP. Athens’ WSS 
utility becomes an autonomous 
public company.   
 
1997 Brazil Rio de Janeiro State 
Complementary Law 87 allowing 
PSP in WSS 
Opening of bidding process for the 
privatization of the state’s water 
utility CEDAE, condition required 
as part of the State Reform 
Programme negotiated with the IMF 
by the Brazilian government 
Following a series of legal battles 
through 1997 and 1998, the state 
government excludes CEDAE prom the 
state’s privatization programme in 
1998. 
1997 Brazil  Services concession contract in Niterói 
(Rio de Janeiro state) for 30 years. 
Although the contract was signed in 
1997 in was not started until 1999 
owing to the legal disputes surrounding 
the failed privatization of the state’s 
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utility CEDAE. 
1997 Tanzania Regional Administration Act 
sanctioning decentralization 
process. Legal reform to promote 
PSP in WSS. National Urban Water 
Authority (NUWA) transformed 
into Dar es Salaam Water Supply 
and Sewerage Authority 
(DAWASA) 
 
1998 Brazil  Services concession contract in Lakes 
Region of Rio de Janeiro state (inter-
municipal body) for 25 years 
1998 Kenya  Service concession contract in Nyeri 
Town for 20 years 
1999 Kenya  Service concession contract in Tala 
Town for 30 years 
1999 Greece  Athens’ WSS utility EYDAP is opened 
to PSP by a process called locally as 
“equitisation”: a minority part of the 
companies shares is floated in the 
exchange market, 39 percent initially 
with the prospect of further expanding 
PSP  
1999 Bolivia  Concession granted for water resources 
and WSS in Cochabamba. The 
concession was ended few months later 
(2000) after a massive mobilisation of 
the population demanding its 
cancellation.  
2003 Tanzania  After several failed bidding processes 
(1999, 2000-2001), a 10-year lease 
contract for WSS in Dar es Salaam was 
signed. 
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